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MEDICAL DECISION MAKING DURING A
SURROGATE PREGNANCY
Thomas Win. Mayo*
"The damned little brat must be protected against her own idi-
ocy, one says to one's self at such times. Others must be protected
against her. It is social necessity. And all these things are true."'
William Carlos Williams
* Assistant Professor of Law, Southern Methodist University. BA., 1971, Amherst Col-
lege; J.D., 1977, Syracuse University.
1. W. WnmLLis, The Use of Force, in THE DocroR Sroams 59-60 (1984). In this
sketch, Williams was describing a doctor's frustration in attempting to examine the tonsils
of a particularly resistant young girl whom he suspected had diphtheria.
Much of this article is concerned with a tradition of paternalism within the medical and
legal professions toward pregnant women, their children, and the medical decisions that
pregnant women make affecting both. A full blown discussion of the moral and sociological
aspects of paternalism is beyond the scope of the article, but it is worth exploring some of
the ways the Williams quotation illustrates the equivocal nature of the tradition.
Williams' comment betrays the feelings of moral superiority that can be produced by
superior technical knowledge, as well as the anger that can result when a patient rejects that
technical knowledge and the benefits it is supposed to confer. When the patient is an infant,
the substitution of an adult's will for the child's may seem harsh at times, but justifiable
and even "necessary." When the patient is an adult, the urge to substitute one %ill for
another is more pernicious. One physician's statement about his adult patient provides an
example: "[W]hen a patient places herself in the care of a surgeon for treatment without
[express limitations] upon his authority, she thereby in law consents that he may perform
such operation as in his best judgment is proper and essential to her welfare." Pratt v.
Davis, 118 IML App. 161, 166 (1905) (testimony of the defendant). The appellate court's
opinion, which rejected the defendant's position, is discussed briefly in J. KAT . 'Im SUM'r
WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 50-51 (1984). Professor Katz describes and criticizes the
temptation of many doctors to treat adult patients like children, to be their "Mommy" or
"Daddy" and to make wise decisions for them. Id. at 126.
On the other hand, as Professor William F. May has observed, the paternal image has
provided one of the most durable models of medical professionalism. W. MAY, THE PH'sI-
cuN's CovENANT 13-62 (1983). Although he acknowledges the dangers of paternalism, or at
least unbridled paternalism, he argues that "[t]he image... signals the need for a compas-
sionate, sometimes sacrificial, authoritative, and nurturant devotion to another's good." Id.
at 62. Thus, viewed constructively, paternalism can be a lens through which the physician
views "the dependence, vulnerability, and exploitability of the sick person (as] impos[ing)
the obligation to enhance the autonomy of the patient." Pellegrino, Letter to the Editor,
259 J.A.M.A. 517 (1988).
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I. INTRODUCTION
It is no exaggeration to say that the attention of the nation
was captured by the celebrated case of "Baby M" as it was tried in
a New Jersey courtroom during the winter of 1987.2 Custody bat-
tles are not usually front-page news, but this, of course, was no
ordinary custody battle. "Baby M" was conceived by artificial in-
semination pursuant to a contract between her biological father,
Dr. William Stern, and Mary Beth Whitehead, a "surrogate
mother ' 3 hired by Dr. Stern to conceive, carry to term, and turn
2. The New York Times, for example, ran no fewer than 34 reports of the trial. See,
e.g., Hanley, Surrogate Seemed 'Perfect,' Father of Baby M Testifies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6,
1987, at B1, col. 2; Hanley, Witness in Baby M Trial Testifies On Disease's Effects in Preg-
nancy, N.Y. Times, Jan. 10, 1987, at L30, col. 1; Hanley, Doctor Disputes Pregnancy Risks
in Baby M Case, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1987, at B2, col. 2; Hanley, Psychiatrist Recommends
Joint Custody of Baby M, N.Y. Times, March 4, 1987, at B2, col. 4.
The press eventually replaced its treatment of the trial as carnival with Mary Beth
Whitehead's life as soap opera. Even after the trial court issued its ruling, readers continued
to be treated to details of the lives of the principals in the case. E.g., Sullivan, Whiteheads
Announce Separation, N.Y. Times, Aug. 5, 1987, at B1, col. 5; Hanley, Whiteheads Divorce
and Cite Battle for Baby M, Not Pregnancy, As Cause, N.Y. Times, Nov. 13, 1987, at B1,
col. 7; Whitehead Is Married in Ceremony in Jersey, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1987, at B3, col.
6.
3. The term "surrogate mother" is rejected by some, who view the surrogate as the
"natural" or "real" mother, and the wife of the biological father as the true "surrogate." See
Capron, Alternative Birth Technologies: Legislative Challenges, 20 U.C. DAVIs L. REv. 679,
679 n.1 (1987). To avoid confusion, however, this article adopts the more common usage of
the term to identify the woman who receives the donor's sperm, whether the point of refer-
ence is before entering into the contract, after artificial insemination, or following the birth
of the child.
Surrogacy arrangements may take a number of genetic forms. The most common, and
the one exemplified by the Baby M case, involves the artificial insemination of S, the surro-
gate, who is unrelated to H, the sperm donor; H and his wife, W, will be the social parents of
the offspring. See American Fertility Society, Ethics Committee, Ethical Considerations of
the New Reproductive Technologies, 46 FERTILITY & STERILITY iS, 62S (Supp. 1986). In a
variation of this pattern, H and W contribute the genetic material to the embryo, either by
natural or artificial insemination or through in vitro fertilization, with the embryo then
transplanted to the "rented womb" of S. See id. at 58S. For a table describing various "re-
productive possibilities," from "traditional reproduction" (gametes from married couple,
natural method of fertilization, gestation in the wife) to "Brave New World" (five different
and unrelated persons provide the male and female gametes, gestation, and social parents of
the offspring), see Capron, supra, at 682.
While noting the genetic differences among the possibilities for surrogacy, most com-
mentators have tended to minimize the significance of these distinctions for purposes of
public policy analysis. See, e.g., American Fertility Society, Ethics Committee, supra, at 58S
("The reservations about surrogate gestational mothers [i.e., women who gestate a geneti-
cally unrelated embryo] are similar to those [concerning surrogates who gestate a genetically
related embryo]"); DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY. REPORT OF THE COMMITTEE
OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY 42-47 (M. Warnock, chair, 1984)
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over after birth a child who would then be raised by Dr. Stern and
his wife, Dr. Elizabeth Stern.4 Moreover, this was the first time a
surrogate mother's refusal to abide by the custody provisions of
her contract-a refusal that added Old Testament overtones to a
late twentieth-century problem4-had gone to a trial. Thus, it
seemed at least likely that the trial court would rule, also for the
first time in a United States jurisdiction, on the legality and en-
forceability of a surrogacy contract in the context of a surrogate
mother's refusal to renounce her parental rights.( Despite these
(both types of surrogacy discussed generally without distinction).
For purposes of this article, no distinction will be observed based on the genetic rela-
tionship of the surrogate to the child she is carrying.
4. See In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128, 1142-43 (N.J. Super. Ct.
Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part and reu'd in part, No. A-39-87 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988).
5. Old Testament parallels can be found in the story of Sarah, Rachel, and Leah and
their handmaidens, Hagar, Bilhah, and Zilpah. See Genesis 16:1-6, 30.1-13; Prinz, Beyond
Baby M: A Jewish View of Surrogate Motherhood, REFORa JUDAISM, Summer 1987, at 2.
However, the strength of the analogy is disputed. Compare Lyons. Letter to the Editor,
Biblical Precedents, N.Y. Times, Mar. 3, 1987, at A26, col 5 and Mark, Letter to the Edi-
tor, Ishmael and Isaac, N.Y. Times, Feb. 13, 1987, at A34, col 5 with Sarna, Letter to the
Editor, Bible No Precedent, N.Y. Times, Mar. 12, 1987, at A30, col 2. See generally Annas,
Protecting the Liberty of Pregnant Patients, 316 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1213 (1987) [hereinafter
Annas, Protecting Liberty] (comparing compelled obstetrical interventions and surrogacy to
the vision of the future in M. ATWOOD, THE HANDMAID'S TALE (1986)); Annas, Pregnant
Women as Fetal Containers, HASTINGS CENTER RaP., Dec. 1986, at 13 [hereinafter Annas,
Fetal Containers] (comparing fetal abuse prosecution with The Handmaid's Tale).
Headline writers appear to favor the story of Solomon, 1 Kings 3:16-28. See Sherman,
N.J. High Court Faces Solomonic Baby M Choice, NAT'J LJ., Sept. 28, 1987, at 8; You've
Pushed Me To It, N.Y. Times, Feb. 5, 1987, at B1, col 2 (partial transcript of recorded
phone conversation in which Mrs. Whitehead threatened, "And I want her, too, so what do
we do, cut her in half?"). The Baby M opinion discloses an inclination toward the Solo-
monic theme. See In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128, 1146 (N.J. Super. Ct
Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part and reo'd in part, No. A-39-87 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988) (quoting
Mary Beth Whitehead, "'I'd rather see me and her (the infant child) dead before you get
her,. .. I gave her life. I can take her life away.' "); 525 A.2d at 1156 ("Mr. Stern would
subordinate his wishes for his daughter and give up visitation because he sees it as damag-
ing to a child to grow up in two families."). I thank Professor Ellen Solender for bringing
these passages to my attention. Of course, the analogy of Solomon's test to child custody
decisions generally, and in particular to the Baby M case, has its limitations. See Minow,
The Judgment of Solomon and the Experience of Justice, in R. CovER & 0. Fiss. THE
STRUCTURE OF PROCEDURE 447 (1979).
6. Earlier reported decisions in other jurisdictions had considered whether surrogacy
violates the prohibition against baby selling in the states' adoption statutes. See Surrogate
Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1986) (surrogacy does not
violate statutory prohibition); Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438, 441,
(1981), cert. denied, 459 U.S. 1183 (1983) (Michigan's adoption laws prohibit payment of fee
to surrogate, but not act of surrogacy itself); In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d
972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817-18 (Surr. Ct. 1986) (holding surrogacy and fee permissible under
existing statutes, but requesting legislative consideration of question). A Michigan case also
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"firsts," the public's appetite for news of the case defies easy expla-
nation. 7 The uniqueness of the central issue of the status of the
surrogacy contract justifies a certain level of interest, but hardly
the preoccupation evidenced by the press coverage. While the fre-
quency with which infertile couples turn to surrogacy arrange-
ments is not susceptible to reliable estimates, the practice does
ruled that the biological father of a child born pursuant to a surrogacy contract could not
petition under the Paternity Act for an order of filiation. See Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122
Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90 (1983). Two reported cases involving surrogacy have re-
sulted in dispositions not on the merits. In Sherwyn & Handel v. California State Dep't of
Social Servs., 173 Cal. App. 3d 52, 58-59, 218 Cal. Rptr. 778, 782 (1985), a California appel-
late court held that two attorneys who claimed to represent over 100 couples in surrogate
arrangements lacked standing to seek a declaratory judgment that California's paternity and
filiation statutes could not constitutionally be applied to surrogacy contracts. In Doe v.
Keane, 658 F. Supp. 216 (W.D. Mich 1987), a surrogate mother gave birth prematurely and
the baby died. Her complaint against the lawyer who arranged the surrogacy contract and
the physicians who artificially inseminated her was dismissed for failure to state a claim
under the U.S. Constitution, amendments XIII & XIV, and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981, 1983, 1985.
658 F. Supp. at 220.
7. It is certainly true, as the Wall Street Journal stated, that the Baby M case
"deal[s] with one corner of the enormous complexity surrounding the most fundamental of
human drives and instincts," see Beyond Baby M, Wall St. J., April 2, 1987, at 28, but it is
far from clear that "[t]hat is no doubt why it has generated so much emotion and conten-
tion." Id. The case exists in a context that includes issues of procreative liberty, abortion
and adoption, but that is only a partial explanation for the notoriety of the case.
8. The absence of regulations and reporting requirements for the surrogacy industry
makes it difficult to come up with firm numbers for the practice. Charles Krauthammer has
estimated the number of surrogacy arrangements in the United States at 500, Krautham-
mer, The Ethics of Human Manufacture, NEW REPUBLIC, May 4, 1987, at 19, while The
Economist estimated the number of surrogate motherhood arrangements at 500 to 600
cases. The Lessons from Baby M, THE ECONOMIST, March 21, 1987, at 16-17 [hereinafter
Lessons]. See also New York State Senate Judiciary Committee, Surrogate Parenting in
New York: A Proposal for Legislative Reform, January 1987, at 3 ("over 500 surrogate
births"). An estimate in 1985 put the number of surrogate births at 600. See Gelman &
Shapiro, Infertility: Babies by Contract, NEWSWEEK, Nov. 4, 1985, at 74.
Even the number of infertile couples in the United States -and, thus, the number of
couples who might consider surrogacy -is uncertain. This is due in part to the fact that
infertility may be defined at least three ways:
(1) Infertility may be defined as the inability to conceive, see In re Baby "M", 217 N.J.
Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128, 1161 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in
part, No. A-39-87 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988), or, more broadly, the ability to conceive "no or only a
few offspring," 1 THE OXFORD COMPANION TO MEDICINE 604 (1986).
(2) The more common clinical definition is failure to conceive after one year of unpro-
tected sexual intercourse. See, e.g., THE MERCK MANUAL OF DIAGNOSIS AND THERAPY 1661
(15th ed. 1987) [hereinafter MERCK MANUAL]; Robertson, Embryos, Families, & Procreative
Liberty: The Legal Structure of the New Reproduction, 59 S. CAL. L. RaY. 939, 944 (1986)
[hereinafter Robertson, Legal Structure]. By this definition, approximately 15% of married
couples experience infertility. See NEW YORK STATE SENATE JUDICIARY COMMITTEE, SURRO-
GATE PARENTING IN NEW YORK: A PROPOSAL FOR LEGISLATIvE REFORM 9 (1987). Forty percent
of these couples can conceive with appropriate medical treatment, MERCK MANUAL, supra,
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not appear to be widespread.9 Furthermore, the percentage of cases
in which the surrogate mother refuses to give custody of her child
to the father and his wife is apparently quite low.10 In view of the
remote applicability of the Baby M case to the lives of most of us,
we must look elsewhere for clues to its grip on our attention. In
particular, it is important to ask what messages the case carries
into the field of law and medicine.
The relevancy of this case to issues concerning advancing
at 1661, which suggests that 1 couple in 11 cannot conceive, even after medical treatment.
(3) The percentage of infertile couples increases, and becomes more indeterminate,
under a third definition: "the inability to conceive, carry or bear a child without significant
risk to either the mother or the fetus." In re Baby "M", 525 A.2d at 1161. The concept of
"risk" might be broadly defined to include not only pregnancies that present a high risk of
morbidity or mortality to mother or child, but also "voluntary" infertility due to genetic
concerns or frequent miscarriages.
9. There are reasons to believe that surrogacy will not become widespread. The num-
ber of women who are willing to conceive and carry a child to term and then renounce all
parental rights is presumably limited. Moreover, some infertile couples undoubtedly view
surrogacy as an unsavory option. See Fleming, Our Fascination With Baby M, N.Y. Times,
March 29, 1987, §6, at 33, 36 (Magazine) (likening surrogacy to "conceptual adultery"). Fur-
ther, as long as the legal rights of the parents are in doubt, risks attach to nearly every
aspect of the arrangement, including the risk (as illustrated by the Baby AM case itself) that
the surrogate mother may decide not to yield custody of the infant to the biological father
and his wife. These uncertainties will deter many infertile couples from trying surrogacy.
Also, alternatives to surrogacy are available (adoption, for instance) and are becoming more
available with each passing year (in vitro fertilization is an example). But see Note, The
Rights of the Biological Father: From Adoption and Custody to Surrogate Motherhood, 12
VT. L Rav. 87, 101 (1987) [hereinafter Note, Rights of Biological Father] (Noel Keane, a
leading advocate of surrogacy, estimates that the number of couples involved in surrogacy
will double annually).
In addition, state legislation is likely to make surrogacy a less available option for some
infertile couples, and a less attractive option even in some jurisdictions that don't ban the
practice. In the nine months after the Baby M trial court's decision was handed down, 70
bills addressing surrogacy were reportedly introduced in 27 states, see Peterson, States As-
sess Surrogate Motherhood, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1987, § 1, at 42, coL 3, and a number of
other bills were pending even before Baby M was decided. See Surrogate Parenthood: A
Legislative Update, 13 Fan. L. Rep. (BNA) 1442 (July 14, 1987). The bills in a minority of
jurisdictions would ban surrogacy (paid, unpaid, or both), and bills pending in at least six
states would allow the surrogate mother to revoke her consent to surrendering the child and
renouncing her parental rights. Andrews, The Aftermath of Baby AT: Proposed State Laws
on Surrogate Motherhood, HASTINGS CENTR REP., Oct./Nov. 1987, at 31, 38 [hereinafter
Andrews, Proposed State Laws]. See also Note, Surrogate Motherhood Legislation: A Sen-
sible Starting Point, 20 IND. L Rv. 879, 890-98 (1987). This latter option (revocable con-
sent) may eventually be adopted by a larger number of states, since it appears to appeal to
both opponents and supporters of surrogacy. Compare Annas, Baby Af: Babies (and Jus-
tice) for Sale, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1987, at 13, 15 [hereinafter Annas, Babies for
Sale] with Lessons, supra note 8, at 16, 17.
10. The Economist has put the number of litigated disputes at three, as of March
1987. Lessons, supra note 8, at 16, 17.
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medical technology is slight, at best. As George Annas has ob-
served, "[s]urrogate motherhood is a nontechnical application of
artificial insemination that requires no sophisticated medical or
scientific knowledge or medical intervention."11 There is, however,
one central aspect of the surrogacy arrangement that has impor-
tant implications for law and medicine. In most surrogacy con-
tracts, the surrogate mother agrees not to have an abortion and to
refrain from certain types of harmful conduct, including the con-
sumption of alcoholic beverages, smoking, and the use of illegal
drugs.12 In the Baby M case, Mary Beth Whitehead also consented
to a psychiatric evaluation, amniocentesis, medical consultations,"
and apparently to all medical interventions deemed desirable for
the health of the mother or the child."' This article will consider
the implications these provisions have for medical decision making
during pregnancy, and for the concepts of individual autonomy, in-
formed consent and the developing doctrine of fetal rights.1"
After this article was written, the New Jersey Supreme Court
11. Annas, The Baby Broker Boom, HASTINGS CENTER REP., June 1986, at 30 [herein-
after Annas, Baby Broker Boom]. As Professor Annas points out, however, the nontechnical
aspect of the procedure did not stop the Kentucky Supreme Court from justifying its refusal
to equate surrogacy with baby selling by stating that it "did not want to interfere with 'a
new era of genetics,' 'solutions offered by science,' and 'new medical services.'" Annas,
supra, quoting Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986). See
also In re Adoption of Baby Girl L.J., 132 Misc. 2d 972, 505 N.Y.S.2d 813, 817-18 (Sur. Ct.
1986) ("biomedical science has advanced man into a new era of genetics which was not
contemplated by either the Kentucky legislature nor [sic] by the New York legislature");
Comment, Surrogate Motherhood: The Attorney's Legal and Ethical Dilemma, 11 CAP. U.
L. REv. 593, 609 (1982) ("surrogate-motherhood is a recent phenomenon, made possible only
through modern-day technological advances"); Whose Baby M?, Wall St. J., Jan. 22, 1987, at
30 ("surrogate motherhood is a feat of medical technology that outdistances our certainty on
how to use it").
12. See Brophy, A Surrogate Mother Contract to Bear A Child, 20 J. FAM. L. 263, 280,
283 (1981-1982).
13. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128, 1143 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. A-39-87 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988).
14. Annas, Protecting Liberty, supra note 5, at 1213 ("contracts, like the one Mary
Beth Whitehead signed, require the pregnant woman to follow 'all medical instructions' ").
15. Because the focus of this article is on the effect to be given to contract provisions
concerning medical decision making during a surrogate pregnancy, the discussion that fol-
lows assumes that within the relevant jurisdiction, as was the case in New Jersey before the
New Jersey Supreme Court's Baby M decision, the contract itself has not been declared
unlawful or void and unenforceable. The prospects for surrogacy contracts in the United
States are uncertain following Baby M. Although a majority of the bills introduced in state
legislatures since the trial court's decision reflect the position that some form of surrogacy
should be permitted, 23 bills pending in 18 states would either criminalize or refuse to en-
force certain forms of surrogacy arrangements. See Andrews, Proposed State Laws, supra
note 9, at 31, 32, 34.
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announced its decision in the Baby M case."6 The court ruled that
the surrogate contract in that case-with its payments to Mary
Beth Whitehead and her irrevocable promise to surrender custody
of the child and to agree to a termination of her parental
rights-"conflicts with the law and public policy of [New Jersey],"
"is illegal and invalid," and is "perhaps criminal. 17 Because after
this opinion only voluntary surrogacy arrangements in which the
surrogate mother has the right to change her mind about custody
are permitted, without legislation validating paid surrogacy there
will be very few, if any, surrogates in New Jersey.1 8 For New
Jersey, therefore, the issues of contract interpretation and enforce-
ment discussed in this article are, as a practical matter, largely
moot.
There are at least two reasons, however, why the trial court's
opinion in Baby M remains an appropriate vehicle for a discussion
of medical decision making during a surrogate pregnancy. First,
many of the problems that can be expected to arise with respect to
medical decisions inhere in the surrogate relationship itself, with-
out regard to the existence of a valid, enforceable contract. To be
sure, in any jurisdiction in which surrogacy contracts are void and
unenforceable, the number of surrogacy arrangements can be ex-
pected to dwindle. But surrogacy will not go away, even in New
Jersey, and many of the ethical and legal issues discussed in this
article remain relevant.
More significantly, surrogacy contracts have not been declared
void as against public policy in most other states. Moreover, most
jurisdictions have bills pending in their legislatures that approve of
surrogacy in one form or another. 9
Any state that recognizes the validity of surrogacy contracts,
whether by decision or by statute, without specifically addressing
the issues discussed in this article, will create a confused and po-
tentially dangerous regime of law. One need only review the Baby
M trial court opinion to appreciate the magnitude of the problems.
Accordingly, while the problems identified here are less acute in
New Jersey after their supreme court's decision to invalidate the
contract, they are unfortunately very much with us in most other
jurisdictions.
16. In re Baby M, No. A-39-87 (N.J. February 3, 1988).
17. Id., slip op. at 4-5.
18. See id. at 23.
19. Refer to notes 9, 15 supra and accompanying text.
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II. MEDICAL DECISIONS: By OR FOR THE SURROGATE?
A. Background: The Contract and the Baby M Opinion20
The surrogacy contract in the Baby M case provided for the
payment by William Stern of Mary Beth Whitehead's medical ex-
penses (including dental and psychiatric evaluation expenses "for
performing her contractual obligations" 21), her legal expenses in-
curred in connection with her execution and performance under
the contract,22 and an additional fee of $10,000.23 Most surrogacy
contracts provide for similar payments. 4
Perhaps the most compelling (and commented upon) aspect of
the Baby M case is the notion that these arrangements make the
practice of surrogacy nothing more or less than baby selling, a
practice that is forbidden by the adoption statutes of most states.23
In the view of many,26 the exchange of cash payments by the bio-
20. Unless the context suggests otherwise, references to the opinion in the Baby M
case are to the trial court's opinion, In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128
(N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. A-39-87 (N.J. Feb. 3,
1988).
21. See In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128, 1143 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch.
Div. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. A-39-87 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988).
22. 525 A.2d at 1160.
23. Id. at 1143.
24. See, e.g., Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v. Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209, 211 (Ky.
1986); Syrkowski v. Appleyard, 122 Mich. App. 506, 333 N.W.2d 90, 90-91 n.1 (1983);
Brophy, supra note 12, at 270-72, 275-77; Comment, Litigation, Legislation, and Limelight:
Obstacles to Commercial Surrogate Mother Arrangements, 72 IowA L. REV. 415, 417-18
(1987).
25. See Capron, supra note 3, at 695-96 n.45; Graham, Surrogate Gestation and the
Protection of Choice, 22 SANTA CLARA L. REv 291, 298-99 & nn.28-29, 31 (1982); Note, De-
veloping a Concept of the Modern "Family". A Proposed Uniform Surrogate Parenthood
Act, 73 GEo. L.J. 1283, 1290 n.53 (1985).
26. See, e.g., Annas, Baby Broker Boom, supra note 11, at 30; Surrogate Parenthood,
73 A.B.A.J. 38 (June 1, 1987) (surrogate parenting contracts should not be enforced
"[b]ecause they're basically contracts for the purchase and sale of a baby, and baby selling
is against the law"); Harrison, The Social Construction of Mary Beth Whitehead in Expert
Testimony 17 (1987) (unpublished manuscript on file at Houston Law Center Library) ("the
commodification of infants to be, the breeding of human beings for transfer of ownership,
creates a new class of people whose lineage and ownership most clearly reflect our society's
worst biases in regard to class, race, and gender"). See also Surrogate Parenting Assocs. v.
Commonwealth, 704 S.W.2d 209, 214 (Ky. 1986) (Vance, J., dissenting) ("a portion of the
payment is withheld and not paid until [the surrogate's] living child is delivered unto the
purchaser, along with the equivalent of a bill of sale, or quit-claim deed, to wit-the judg-
ment terminating her parental rights"); Johnson, The Baby "M" Decision: Specific Per-
formance of a Contract for Specially Manufactured Goods, 11 S. ILL. U.L. REv. 1339, 1343-
46 (1987) ("I used to think of Property Law and Health Law as being two unrelated sub-
jects. Well, apparently I was wrong."). But see Prinz, supra note 5, at 2, 3; Lessons, supra
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logical father and a newborn child by the surrogate mother is in-
distinguishable from the exchange of money (beyond certain enu-
merated expenses in some states) for children that is forbidden in
the adoption statutes. This view gets some support from the fact
that payment of the full amount of the fee was required in the
Baby M case only upon delivery of a live child,27 and that the fee
was to be reduced from $10,000 to $1,000 if the surrogate mother
suffered a miscarriage.28
The trial court's opinion in the Baby M case rejected alto-
gether the argument that surrogacy is the same as baby selling,2 a
conclusion with which other courts had earlier both agreed 0 and
disagreed.3, The Baby M court found that the father paid the fee
to "the surrogate for her willingness to be impregnated and carry
his child to term. '32 There was no sale and purchase of a baby,
wrote the court, because the biological father "cannot purchase
what is already his."'33 This argument, of course, begs the very
question being litigated by assuming that the child is the biological
father's and not the biological (surrogate) mother's. It also ignores
entirely that at least a part of the fee is allocable solely to the de-
livery of the child to the father.
Although the baby-selling argument is a serious one, it also
implicates more than a narrow dispute over the construction to be
given to the adoption statutes in those jurisdictions where excess
payments to the mother are prohibited. The Baby M case brought
surrogacy dramatically into focus at a time when the medical world
was reporting breakthroughs in fetal tissue transplantation and
other "brave new world" technological developments,4 and when
note 8, at 16.
27. Annas, Babies for Sale, supra note 9, at 13, 14.
28. See id. See also Doe v. Keane, 658 F. Supp. 216, 218 (W.D. Mich. 1987); Brophy,
supra note 12, at 276-77.
29. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128, 1157 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. A-39-87 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988).
30. See Surrogate Parenting Assocs. Inc. v. Kentucky, 704 S.W.2d 209 (Ky. 1986). The
Kentucky Supreme Court held that surrogacy does not violate the state's prohibition
against baby selling because the price was agreed to before conception and the surrogate
mother had the right to cancel the contract up to the point of relinquishing her parental
rights. Id. at 211-12.
31. See Doe v. Kelley, 106 Mich. App. 169, 307 N.W.2d 438 (1981), cert. denied, 459
U.S. 1183 (1983) (baby selling statute bars payment of fee to surrogate mother).
32. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313,525 A.2d 1128, 1157 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. A-39-87 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988).
33. 525 A.2d at 1157.
34. Reports in professional journals as well as the popular press prompted critical
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the dominant health story of 1987-the worldwide pandemic of ac-
quired immune deficiency syndrome (AIDS)-was regarded by
some as a warning against the costs of drug abuse and profligate,
unprotected sex. Baby M's theme of the commercialization of sex
and of life itself, the idea that life may be bought and sold like a
commodity, seemed to reinforce the public's fears that the way we
view ourselves and others, our conception of the body and of body
parts, as well as traditional notions of individual autonomy, have
changed too fast and in a direction that is more to be feared than
embraced.3 5 As Professor Alexander Capron has reminded us, "The
commentary on these issues, even before Baby M went to trial. Cf. Robertson, Legal Struc-
ture, supra note 8; Annas, Redefining Parenthood and Protecting Embryos: Why We Need
New Laws, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Oct. 1984 at 50; Some of the more recent developments
include Sherman, The Selling of Body Parts, NAT'L L.J., Dec. 10, 1987 at 1; Medrazo, Corre-
spondence to the Editor, Transplantation of Fetal Substantia Nigra and Adrenal Medulla
to the Caudate Nucleus in Two Patients with Parkinson's Disease, 318 NEW ENG. J. MED.
51 (1988); Kolata, Multiple Fetuses Raise New Issues Tied to Abortion, N.Y. Times, Jan.
25, 1988, at Al, col. 1; Holzgreve, Kidney Transplantation from Anencephalic Donors, 316
NEW ENG. J. MED. 1069 (1987); Blakeslee, New Attention Focused on Infant Organ Donors,
N.Y. Times, Dec. 14, 1987, at A18, col. 1; Lewin, Medical Uses of Fetal Tissues Spurs New
Abortion Debate, N.Y. Times, Aug. 16, 1987, at Al, col. 1.
The level of professional and lay concern over the ethical issues raised by new medical
technologies exemplifies a much older notion. "Bertrand Russell had hold of some truth
when he said, 'Whatever else is mechanical, values are not.' But the remark was libelous of
machinery. A flipped over version of Russell's remark would be the analysis that philoso-
phers probably need more to hear: Whatever else is valueless, machines are not." S. TANEN-
BAUM, ENGINEERING DISABILITY PUBLIC POLICY AND COMPENSATORY TECHNOLOGY 17 (1986)
(emphasis in original), quoting Shriver, Invisible Doorway: Hope As A Technological Vir-
tue, in TECHNOLOGY AND THE FUTURE OF MAN (J. Haberer ed. 1973). Although Shriver's re-
mark was limited to machines, it has obvious but useful implications for technology gener-
ally, as well as specifically for medical technology and "the brave new world of human
manufacture that is now dawning," Krauthammer, supra note 8, at 17.
35. Diana Brahams has argued that a similar confluence of events and fears focused
British attention on surrogacy, also in a particularly negative way, in 1985. Brahams, The
Hasty British Ban on Commercial Surrogacy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Feb. 1987, at 18.
Brahams describes the basis for the anxiety produced by what "some regard as the dismal
slide into today's rudderless society." Id. The first manifestation of that anxiety was the
Warnock Report, which recommended the criminalization of commercial surrogacy agencies
and a statutory declaration that "all surrogacy arrangements are illegal contracts and there-
fore unenforceable in the courts." See DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH & SOCIAL SECURITY, REPORT
OF THE COMMITTEE OF INQUIRY INTO HUMAN FERTILISATION AND EMBRYOLOGY 85-86 (Dame
Mary Warnock, chairman, 1984). The second manifestation was the Surrogacy Arrange-
ments Act, 1985, ch. 49, which implemented the recommendations of the Warnock Report
on surrogacy.
The relatively restricted scope of this article is not meant to suggest that there are not
other issues of profound importance raised by the practice of surrogacy and by the court's
opinion in the Baby M case. Motherhood, parenthood, gender and class bias and exploita-
tion, procreative liberty: these and many other issues have been commented upon at some
length in the massive and growing body of literature on the subject. See, e.g., Alexander,
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Baby M case... involves at its core the interest of a child who is
not a party to the contract."36 The decision, therefore, shares at
least one central concern common to fetal tissue transplantation,
organ donations from anencephalic newborns, and the various
forms of in vitro fertilization: establishing the human and legal
rights of an unrepresented and unprotected third party of especial
vulnerability.
The recognition and reconciliation of potentially conflicting
rights-those of the baby, the surrogate mother, and the biological
father-begin with the surrogacy contract. Surrogacy arrangements
vary from case to case, but standard elements (allowing for varia-
tions on each theme) are well known. One element deals with lifes-
tyle and medical care decisions during gestation;37 these have an
impact on the health of the child, either directly or by affecting the
health of the surrogate mother. Another set of provisions deals
more specifically with a subset of those general health care con-
cerns: the decision to have or to forego an abortion.
1. Restrictions on the Right to Abortion. The abortion provi-
sions of surrogate contracts generally work together to produce one
result: for purposes of the contract, 8 both the decision to abort the
Surrogate Motherhood Creates Controversial Social, Legal Issues, Tvx. Hosps. July 1987,
at 49; Annas, Babies For Sale, supra note 9, at 13; Annas, The Baby Broker Boom, supra
note 11, at 30; Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions
for Solutions, 50 TENN. L REv. 71 (1982); Elias & Annas, Social Policy Considerations in
Noncoital Reproduction, 255 J.A.MA. 62 (1986); Hollinger, From Coitus to Commerce: Le-
gal and Social Consequences of Noncoital Reproduction, 18 JL. REioma 8M5 (1985); John-
son, supra note 26; Lorio, Alternative Means of Reproduction: Virgin Territory for Legisla-
tion, 44 UA L REv. 1641 (1984); Prinz, supra note 5, at 2; Robertson, Legal Structure, supra
note 8; Smith, The Razor's Edge of Human Bonding: Artificial Fathers and Surrogate
Mothers, 5 W. NEW ENG. L. RPv. 639 (1983); Stumpf, Redefining Mother: A Legal Matrix
for New Reproductive Technologies, 96 YALE LJ. 187 (1986); Note, Rumpelstiltshin Revis-
ited: The Inalienable Rights of Surrogate Mothers, 99 HAy. L. REv. 1936 (1985)[hereinaf-
ter Note]; Comment, supra note 24; Arkes, Judge Sorkow May Have Overstepped His
Bounds, Wall St. J., April 9, 1987, at 24, cols. 3-6; Lessons, supra note 8, at 16, 17.
36. Capron, supra note 3, at 700.
37. In addition to the lifestyle and medical care provisions applicable during gestation,
surrogate contracts typically include provisions that require psychiatric and psychological
reviews before artificial insemination, physical examinations before insemination (including
genetic evaluations and testing for venereal diseases), testing to determine whether insemi-
nation has resulted in conception, and post-delivery tests (e.g., blood group, serum proteins,
red cell enzymes, or white cell/H.L.A.) to establish paternity. See Brophy, supra note 12, at
274-77. Although these tests and reviews may raise some of the same issues discussed in the
text, they are probably less likely to do so and, where they do, the issues are largely the
same as for health care issues that arise during gestation.
38. The abortion provisions attempt to establish the rules for the respective rights and
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fetus and the decision not to abort are placed entirely in the hands
of persons other than the surrogate mother. In a model surrogate
mother contract proposed by Katie Marie Brophy, this is done in a
single provision, which provides:
The Surrogate agrees that she will not abort the child once
conceived except, if in the opinion of the inseminating physician,
such action is necessary for the physical health of the Surrogate
or the child has been determined by said physician to be physio-
logically abnormal. In the event of either of those two (2) contin-
gencies, the Surrogate desires and agrees to have said abortion.89
Thus, the surrogate waives the right she would otherwise have to
an abortion and simultaneously consents to have an abortion if, in
the opinion of the inseminating physician, the surrogate's health is
imperiled or the child is physiologically abnormal. Significantly, no
"physiological abnormalities" are specified in the contract, nor
does the contract place any limit upon the physician's discretion in
determining the existence of an abnormality or the father's discre-
tion in suggesting the existence of one. Under the contract, a fetus
with a neural tube defect (such as anencephaly 0) that will result in
either a stillbirth or death within a few days of birth is indistin-
guishable from a fetus with a permanent medical condition, such
as Downs syndrome, or one with a congenital heart defect that is
surgically correctable after birth. Given the imprecision of the con-
tract, any of these fetuses could be determined to be "abnormal"
and subject to the contract's abortion provision.
The abortion provision in the contract in the Baby M case dif-
fers slightly from the Brophy model.41 Mary Beth Whitehead
agreed not to have an abortion unless the fetus was "found to have
a genetic or congenital abnormality" and "if Mr. Stern requested
obligations of the surrogate mother and the biological father with respect to, for example,
medical expenses, support obligations, payment of the surrogate's fee and expenses.
39. Brophy, supra note 12, at 280. Ms. Brophy is a lawyer in Kentucky, "where she
assists infertile couples in the surrogate procedure." Id. at 263, n.1.
40. "Anencephaly, absence of cerebral hemispheres, is incompatible with life." Merck
Manual, supra note 7, at 1950. Anencephaly, as well as other categories of neurulation de-
fects (craniorachischisis and meningomyelocele) may be prenatally diagnosed by testing for
the level of alpha-fetoprotein in the amniotic fluid, amniocentesis, and ultrasonography. See
Lemire, Neural Tube Defects, 259 J.A.M.A. 558, 559 (1988).
41. The contract between Mary Beth Whitehead and William Stern, although given a
disappointingly casual and off-handed summary in the trial court opinion, is reproduced in
"Appendix A" in the New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion. See In re Baby "M," A-39-87,
slip op. at 1191A (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988).
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it.' 2 The practical effect of this provision is probably the same as
the abortion clause in the Brophy contract, given the unlikelihood
that an abortion would be performed under the latter agreement if
the biological father objected.
Although the case did not involve the abortion issue, the Baby
M trial court nevertheless struck down the abortion provision in its
entirety, on the ground that its enforcement would violate the sur-
rogate's constitutionally protected right, under Roe v. Wade,43 to
decide whether to have an abortion. In so doing, the court followed
the nearly universal criticisms of such limitations in the commen-
tary on surrogate contracts." It was clearly the court's view that
the abortion provision could not be enforced by an action for in-
junctive relief, either to prohibit an otherwise lawful abortion or to
force the unwilling surrogate mother to have an abortion. The full
implications of the trial court's declaration that the abortion provi-
sion is "void and unenforceable,"45 however, are far from clear.
Consider the situation in which a surrogate, after she is told
that the baby has Downs syndrome and the natural father invokes
the abortion clause of the contract, refuses to have the abortion.
When the child is born, the father states that the surrogate's re-
fusal to -abort was a material breach of the contract and argues
that he should be able to avoid his promise in the contract to take
custody of the baby. Alternatively, the father states that he has no
support obligation. Katie Marie Brophy is presumably correct
when she states "that breach by [the surrogate] would not affect
the child's right to support from its natural father.' 40 Whether the
surrogate could insist that the natural father accept custody raises
a "reverse-Baby M" issue (one which, it is hoped, would rarely if
ever arise) that should probably be resolved in accordance with the
best interests of the child.
42. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128, 1143 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ci. Div.
1987) (emphasis in original), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. A-39-87 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988).
43. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
44. Cf., e.g., Capron, supra note 3, at 696 (no specific performance or award of dam-
ages in contract or tort should be available for the surrogate's exercise of her protected right
to choose whether or not to abort).
45. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313,525 A.2d 1128, 1159 (N.J. Super. CL Ch. Div.
1987), affl'd in part and reu'd in part, No. A-39-87 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988).
46. Brophy, supra note 12, at 282. See also Note, Rights of Biological Father, supra
note 9, at 119, in which the author proposes a statutory amendment to avoid this result by
providing that "the [biological father] should not be liable for future child support
payments."
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Another set of more difficult issues is created when the surro-
gate wants to obtain an abortion and the father wants her to carry
the baby to term. It is worth asking at the outset why, as the Baby
M court clearly believed, the agreement not to have an abortion
should not be specifically enforceable."" The United States Su-
preme Court's decisions are not much help. In Roe v. Wade48 and
subsequent abortion cases,49 the Court has stated that the scope of
the state's interest in the mother's decision to have an abortion
during the first two trimesters is limited to the protection of ma-
ternal health. The lack of a nexus to maternal health led the Court
in Planned Parenthood v. Danforth50 to strike down a state stat-
ute that required a pregnant woman to obtain the consent of her
spouse before she could have a first-trimester abortion. The
Court's rationale was based upon an application of the nondelega-
tion doctrine to Roe: the state lacked the power to veto a woman's
abortion decision and therefore could not delegate to another a
right that the state itself lacked. Although the statute in Danforth
presents an appealing analogy to the surrogacy contract, 1 that
47. Admittedly, the injunction would be easy enough to violate. It probably would not
run against the surrogate's obstetrician or her hospital, and in any event she could go to a
different doctor, hospital, or city to obtain the abortion. Depending upon the availability of
timely appellate review of the injunction, the surrogate might then face the possibility of
contempt sanctions. Cf. Walker v. City of Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307 (1967)(petitoner could
not bypass order by judicial review of temporary injunction before disobeying order); United
States v. United Mine Workers, 330 U.S. 258 (1947)(district court had power to issue a
restraining order; disobedience punishable as criminal contempt). Although, as a general
rule, the lawfulness of the underlying order that was violated will not be reviewed on appeal
from the imposition of the contempt sanction, the nature of the rights involved and the
possibility in a given case of irreparable harm as a result of obeying the injunction might
lead a reviewing court to consider the validity of the underlying order. Cf. Maness v. Mey-
ers, 419 U.S. 449 (1975)(although even correct orders must be obeyed until set aside, party
may not be held in contempt for asserting fifth amendment privilege even in an injuntion
action).
48. 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
49. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct.
2169, 2178-84 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 443 (1983).
50. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
51. The argument would be this: If the state may not condition a woman's right to
abortion on the consent of her spouse, it surely could not allow the right to be conditioned
upon the consent of an unrelated third party. This argument ignores the existence of the
contract in which the surrogate purported to give the father that veto power and then, para-
doxically, assumes the existence of a bright-line distinction between rights within traditional
family relationships and the contract-based rights within an artificial, surrogate-family rela-
tionship. The distinction may not be strong enough to sustain the argument. See Note,
supra note 35, at 1939 & n.17.
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case dealt only with the situation where the state unilaterally im-
posed the spousal consent requirement upon a pregnant woman by
statute. Neither Danforth nor Roe presented the Court with an op-
portunity to decide the contract-based rights of spouses or of other
contracting persons.5
The question raised by the existence of an explicit promise not
to abort is a particular example of a more general concern: whether
a person is free to alienate her right of autonomy. 3 A different
particular case that raises the same question is slavery- May a per-
son contract away her freedom and sell herself into slavery? The
thirteenth amendment 4 and cases decided under it 5 provide an
answer to that question: no. Similarly, under common law princi-
ples, a person is free to enter into an employment contract, but she
may not be compelled to perform against her will."6 A more appo-
site contract doctrine makes unenforceable an antenuptial promise
that purports to waive the promisor's right to obtain a divorce.5 7
Professor Kronman's justification for the latter rule--the promisor
52. A recent commentator has argued that Roe and Danforth do not "preclude enforc-
ing the [surrogate's] promise not to abort." See Note, supra note 35, at 1940. In the com-
mentator's view, Roe made the right to a first-trimester abortion indefeasible, and "Dan-
forth makes the right nondelegable." Id. The surrogate's promise, argues the author, raises
an analytically distinct issue: whether the right to abortion is freely alienable. Id. The au-
thor argues against alienability of the right to abortion, not for reasons of paternalism, but
because of the importance of that right to the mother's sense of personhood and the com-
paratively lesser impact of an abortion on the personhood of the biological father. Id.
53. There may be a sense in which autonomy cannot be contracted away, a sense in
which the rational abdication of one's status as an autonomous moral agent is a contradic-
tion in terms. After critically reviewing the relevant writings of Locke, Spinoza, Rousseau,
Kant, and Mill on the subject, Arthur Kuflik has written, "[tihe right to function as a ra-
tionally self-accountable moral agent can be lost (if one loses the capacity to so function) or
perhaps even forfeited (through criminal conduct), but it cannot be legitimately abdicated."
Kufiik, The Inalienability of Autonomy, 13 PHM. & Pu. AFr. 271, 295-96 (1984). Kuflik
summarizes his central argument as follows: "[insofar as the agent's decision is rationally
defensible, it is not actually a decision to abdicate autonomy, insofar as it is a decision to
abdicate autonomy, it is demonstrably irrational" Id. at 285. Kuflik's thesis does not con-
sider whether a moral justification exists for the state to enforce a contract that was entered
into rationally but which the promisor subsequently repudiates through an exercise of moral
autonomy.
54. See U.S. Const., amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."). See also Peonage
Abolition Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1982).
55. See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 150 (1914); Heflin v. Sandford, 142
F.2d 798, 799 (5th Cir. 1944); State v. Oliva, 144 La. 51, 51-52, 80 So. 195, 196 (1918).
56. See K FARNswoiRr, CoNRaAcrs § 12.7, at 835-36 (1982).
57. See Kronman, Paternalism and the Law of Contracts, 92 YALE L.J. 763, 764, 777,
779 (1983).
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has "contract[ed] away too large a part of [her] personal lib-
erty"5 -provides an equally persuasive statement of the reasons
why a surrogate's promise not to abort should not be specifically
enforced:
When someone assumes a contractual obligation, he generally has
certain goals he believes will be promoted by the arrange-
ment. . . . If, however, a person's goals have changed signifi-
cantly, his earlier decision may now appear irrational, for his orig-
inal aims no longer provide the framework for his
deliberations .... From the standpoint of his present values,
which he cannot shake off or suspend, his past actions may seem
pointless or evil . . . This can be especially demoralizing. Al-
though there are countless ways in which a person's aspirations
can be defeated by the senselessness of the world, if he himself is
somehow responsible for the defeat, he may feel not only that he
has been overborne by reality, but that he has, in Aristotle's
words, failed to be a friend to himself.59
In Kronman's view, specific performance of the promise, as op-
posed to permitting the promisor to substitute money damages for
performance, only intensifies the promisor's sense of self-betrayal,
further weakening the promisor's self-confidence and self-respect.0
It is with these evils in mind, argues Kronman, that the law prop-
erly permits the promisor to avoid such dire results by allowing
him to substitute payment of damages for performance of the
promise.6e
Professor Kronman's justification for the concededly paternal-
istic imposition of limitations on the freedom to contract in certain
situations is particularly helpful in understanding the position of
the surrogate mother whose goals have changed and who no longer
wants to (or perhaps no longer feels she can) perform her part of
the bargain. Performance of the surrogacy contract requires per-
sonal services of the most intimate kind that strike at a fundamen-
tal level of personal identity and self-worth.2  The thirteenth
amendment and common-law contract doctrine should not be in-
terpreted so as to compel such services to be rendered against the
surrogate mother's will. The Baby M trial court's statement that
58. Id. at 775.
59. Id. at 780-82 (footnote omitted).
60. Id. at 782.
61. Id. at 783.
62. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
[Vol. 25:599
SURROGATE PREGNANCY
the abortion provision is unenforceable presumably meant at least
this much.
But did the court mean to say more? If a surrogate mother
cannot be enjoined from doing so and voluntarily aborts the fetus
during the first trimester of her pregnancy without the biological
father's consent, may the father sue for breach of contract to avoid
any further liability under the agreement or to recover any fees or
expenses already paid? The court's conclusion that the abortion
provision is unenforceable is apparently based upon its inconsis-
tency with Roe v. Wade, but a contractual provision that violates
public policy is not automatically "void" and may sometimes sup-
port, as a matter of contract law, an award of monetary damages."
The first issue, however, is one of more general interest: whether
an award of damages for the surrogate's breach of her promise not
to abort would be constitutional.
At least in other contexts, the United States Supreme Court
has stated that one's constitutional right to engage in certain con-
duct does not necessarily provide immunity from civil liability for
doing so. The Court's first amendment speech decisions, for exam-
ple, demonstrate that the right to be free from the government's
prior restraint does not immunize a publisher from liability for
damages for the resulting libel" or for infringement of the plain-
tiff's copyright65 or right of publicity.66 In addition, the Court has
declared that, although federal and state governments generally
may not interfere with a woman's right to abortion during the first
trimester, they may withhold public funding for both therapeutic
and nontherapeutic abortions.6
63. See J. CALAmAm & J. PamuLO, THE LAw OF CONTRACTS 887-904 (3d ed. 1987).
64. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964)(reversing $500,000 libel
judgment against newspaper finding that the rule of law applied by Alabama courts was
constitutionally deficient for failure to provide safeguards for freedom of speech and press
required by first and fourteenth amendments).
65. See Harper & Row, Publishers Inc. v. Nation Enter., 471 U.S. 539 (1985)(holding
magazine's unauthorized publication of verbatim quotes from presidential memoirs was
commercially valuable right of first publication, and was not a "fair use" within meaning of
Copyright Revision Act).
66. See Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)(hblding
that although the state of Ohio might, as a matter of its own law, allow the press special
privilege, the first and fourteenth amendments did not require it).
67. See Williams v. Zbaraz, 448 U.S. 358 (1980); Harris v. McRae, 448 US. 297 (1980);
Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464 (1977). The Court's focus in these cases was principally upon a
different issue than the one raised by the breach of contract hypothetical, namely, whether
the first or fourteenth amendment required the state and federal governments to budget for
expenditures that would provide pregnant women with adequate funds to choose to have an
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Neither line of cases, however, answers the question whether,
under the Supreme Court's decision in Roe v. Wade,"5 a state court
could award damages against a surrogate mother for having a first-
trimester abortion. Obviously, the speech cases do not involve
abortion. More significantly, the speech cases do involve conduct
which, unlike a first-trimester abortion, is itself independently tor-
tious. Moreover, the abortion funding decisions raised the question
whether public funds for abortions were benefits to which indigent
women were constitutionally entitled; these cases involved separa-
tion of powers and federalism issues of great sensitivity. By con-
trast, the breach of contract issue asks whether the award of dam-
ages to the biological father would be an impermissible ex post
facto penalty for the surrogate mother's prior exercise of her right
to abort the fetus."'
Under Roe, the relevant question is whether the state's inter-
est, if any, in vindicating the contractual interests of the biological
father, or in promoting the practice of surrogacy, rises to the level
of a "compelling state interest" that would justify imposing a limi-
tation (in the form of money damages for the breach of contract)
on the surrogate's fundamental right to have an abortion. Presum-
ably neither interest is "compelling" for purposes of the Roe case,
especially in light of the Court's repeated statements that the
scope of the state's interest during the first two trimesters is lim-
ited to protecting maternal health.70 If this is correct, then an
award of damages for breach of the surrogate contract would be
permissible under Roe and its progeny only if the incidental re-
striction on the surrogate mother's right to an abortion were
deemed not to be "significant" or if the surrogate mother has the
power to contract away her rights under Roe.
On the issue of the significance of money damages, an argu-
abortion if they wished. Thus, the Court was confronted with an entitlements issue in these
cases, although the impact of these budget decisions on the ability of indigent women to
choose was undeniable.
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. If the denial of a public benefit seems to be as significant an interference with the
freedom of choice to have an abortion as an after the fact award of damages for breach of
contract, you are in good company. Three of the four dissenting justices in Harris v. McRae
reached the same conclusion. See 448 U.S. 297, 329 (1980) (Brennan, Marshall & Blacknun,
JJ., dissenting).
70. See Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 106 S. Ct.
2169, 2178-84 (1986); City of Akron v. Akron Center for Reproductive Health, 462 U.S. 416,
443 (1983); Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 162-64 (1973).
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ment-one that is instructive but ultimately inadequate - can be
built upon the Supreme Court's cases dealing with racial cove-
nants. After holding in Shelley v. Kraemer71 that a state court's
order enforcing a racially restrictive covenant would violate the
fourteenth amendment, the Court in Barrows v. Jackson 2 held
that an award of monetary damages against a white property
owner who breached his racially restrictive covenant and sold land
to a buyer who was black also violated the fourteenth amendment.
Both the order of specific performance and the award of damages
were forms of coercion by which the state either commanded or
encouraged racial discrimination. If the analogy between state or-
dered racial discrimination and active state interference with first
trimester abortions is accepted, the logic of Barrows is clear: with
respect to abortions, as with racial discrimination, a state may not
penalize conduct that it lacks the power to forbid.
This conclusion finds further support, although still no proof
of its correctness, in another of the Court's abortion decisions. As
noted above, the Court in Danforth3 ruled that a state could not
condition a woman's right to a first trimester abortion upon the
written consent of her husband. Borrowing from Barrows, the state
should also be prohibited from doing through the award of con-
tract damages that which it could not do by statute. If the state
may not require spousal consent for a first trimester abortion, it
should not be able to penalize a woman with an award of damages
on the basis of her failure to obtain the biological father's consent
before having an abortion. 4
What the Shelley-Barrows-Roe-Danforth line of cases fails to
take into account, however, is that-unlike the blacks in the re-
strictive covenant cases or the pregnant women in the abortion
cases-the surrogate mother has purported to contract away her
first and fourteenth amendment protections as part of her bar-
71. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
72. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
73. Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
74. For purposes of the argument presented here, the distinction between a pregnant
woman's spouse and, in the surrogacy context, an unrelated biological father is not particu-
larly valuable. It seems likely that the state in Danforth required spousal consent because a
pregnant woman's husband is presumed to be the father of the child. Thus, despite the lack
of a marriage relationship with the surrogate mother, the biological father could at least
claim the same status (paternity) as the spouse of a pregnant woman on the basis of the
surrogacy contract and the execution of other documents that would overcome the common-
law or statutory presumption that the husband of the surrogate is the father of the child.
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gained-for exchange with the biological father.75 May she do so and
be held liable in damages for failing to keep her promise? The Su-
preme Court's opinion in Snepp v. United States7 suggests that
she may.
Snepp, a former employee of the Central Intelligence Agency,
had published a book about the agency without first submitting
the manuscript to the agency for a pre-publication review." At the
time he accepted employment with the CIA, Snepp agreed not to
publish any information about the agency without presenting it to
his employer for a review.78 The CIA sued for a declaration that
Snepp had breached the contract, an injunction against publishing
information in the future without submitting it to the CIA first,
and an award of damages .7  In the presentation before the Su-
preme Court, Snepp's principal argument was that the contract
and subsequent injunction constituted an unenforceable prior re-
straint. The Court disposed of his argument in a single footnote:
Snepp signed the contract, apparently without duress or coercion,
and he must now live with the consequences of that act, including
the award of damages for his breach of the contract.80 Since the
chilling effect of money damages on Snepp's right of free speech
was an incident of his prior exercise of his freedom of contract,
there was no first amendment basis for setting aside the award of
damages. Significantly, the government had stipulated that
Snepp's book contained no confidential information.' Thus, the
Court affirmed the award of damages against Snepp for breaching
his employment contract under circumstances where there would
almost surely have been no grounds for a lawful prior restraint
against publication, even on national security grounds.
The result in Snepp suggests that the Court is not particularly
troubled by an award of damages to penalize conduct that the gov-
75. The Shelley-Barrows-Roe-Danforth line of cases does accomplish one thing: It
demonstrates that, in the absence of a contract (or, if the surrogate mother is unable to
contract away her abortion rights), the state probably lacks the power to award damages to
the biological father in tort. Thus, the question whether the surrogate may validly contract
her abortion rights away is critically important to the father's claim for damages.
76. 444 U.S. 507 (1980).
77. Id. at 507.
78. Id. at 507-08.
79. Id. at 508.
80. Id. at 509 n.3. The Court also noted that the CIA's action was within the scope of
its broad authority to protect the national security. Id.
81. See id. at 516 (Stevens, Brennan & Marshall, JJ., dissenting).
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ernment would have been powerless to enjoin, at least where the
damages flow from the breach of a voluntary, explicit contract. Be-
cause both freedom of speech and privacy-based abortion rights in-
volve core values protected by the first amendment, the result in
Snepp is suggestive. If anything, Snepp was a weaker case for the
Court to uphold the constitutionality of an award of damages than
is the surrogacy case, because Snepp's contract was with the fed-
eral government, not simply another private citizen. The potential
for conflict with the restrictions of the first amendment was pre-
sumably greater in Snepp, or was raised in an important sense
more directly, than it would be if a court were to award damages to
a biological father for the surrogate's breach. Consequently, a sur-
rogate mother's explicit agreement, absent any indications of du-
ress or coercion (which will be rare), may tip the scales in favor of
the constitutionality of an award of damages for her breach of the
promise not to have an abortion.
The damages award would also be consistent with the underly-
ing contract law rationale for refusing to compel performance of
the contract, by which the surrogate is free to choose to substitute
money damages for performance.82 As a matter of contract law,
then, a court should also be free to choose an appropriate measure
of damages for such cases s unless, of course, such an award would
82. This seems to be the point Professor Charles Fried argues for when he states that
compassion for a promisor who "no longer values the promise as highly as when he made it
... may lead a promisee to release an obligation in such a case, but he releases as an act of
generosity, not as a duty, and certainly not because the promisors repentance destroys the
force of the original obligation." C. FaR=. CoirRAcT As PROMISE 20 (1981). In Fried's view,
this attitude affirms the promisor's autonomy because showing "respect for others as free
and rational requires taking seriously their capacity to determine their own values." Id. This
version of autonomy has been termed "wide autonomy" and includes the right to bind one-
self to the will of outside authority as an act of personal autonomy. See McMahn, Auton-
omy and Authority, 16 PHi. & Put. Asp. 303, 304 (1987).
83. Of the usual measures of damages-expectancy, restitution, and reli-
ance-restitution seems the most appropriate. Expectation-based damages-an amount that
would put the biological father in as good a position as he would have been if the surrogate
had not had an abortion-would be too speculative and potentially too generous. Reliance
damages-an award that would put the biological father back in his original, pre-contract
position-would require the surrogate to pay not only her fee, but all sums paid to reim-
burse her for expenses, as well as all payments to third parties. Both expectation and reli-
ance-based damages ignore the fact that the surrogate partially performed the contract by
submitting to psychological and medical testing, artificial insemination, and the medical
risks of pregnancy before the abortion. The return of all of the father's expenditures in
reliance on the contract also unrealistically ignores that the contract itself included some
significant risk that-because of accident, injury, or illness-a live, healthy baby would not
be produced by the surrogate pregnancy. But see Brophy, supra note 12, at 279 (proposing
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violate the public policy of the state.
2. Provisions Dealing With Life-Style and Medical Care De-
cisions. The Baby M trial court did not consider the surrogacy con-
tract's lifestyle and medical care provisions. In most surrogacy con-
tracts, these provisions take a number of different forms. Most
often, the surrogate agrees: (1) not to smoke cigarettes, drink alco-
hol, take any medications without written consent from a physi-
cian, or consume illicit drugs during pregnancy; (2) to visit the in-
seminating physician or obstetrical specialist regularly (or
according to a fixed schedule specified in the contract); (3) to sub-
mit to genetic screening, including amniocentesis, after conception;
(4) to follow reasonable medical instructions; and (5) to submit to
reasonable pregnancy-related medical care or treatment.8 4 So that
compliance with these various provisions may be monitored and
the biological father may exercise his rights under the contract, the
surrogate also agrees to waive the confidentiality of psychological
and psychiatric test results and medical information developed
during the pregnancy. s5
There can be no doubt that these provisions seek to further
the laudable goal of promoting maternal and fetal health. In doing
so, however, the contractual imposition of rights and obligations
contractual provision for the payment to the biological father of all monies paid by him on
her behalf); Note, Rights of Biological Father, supra note 9, at 119-20 (supporting the
award of something approaching expectancy-based damages: "all money which the biological
father has paid for medical and other expenses associated with the pregnancy" plus "an
amount of money established by the legislature to compensate the biological father for the
breach of contract").
Damages based on the father's restitution interest-an amount that would require the
surrogate mother to disgorge her gains and would return the surrogate to her original, pro-
contract position-eliminates the problem of unjust enrichment, recognizes the risks of the
contract, and avoids imposing too great a penalty on the surrogate mother's abortion deci-
sion. On the other hand, restitution will provide a small recovery compared to the disap-
pointment and feeling of loss that the biological father and his wife will feel. See Eaton,
Comparative Responses to Surrogate Motherhood, 65 Nan. L. REV. 686, 722 (1986). Bills
pending in Illinois and Missouri appear to adopt a restitution theory of damages in the case
of a voluntary abortion that is not medically necessary, permitting the biological father to
recover fees and expenses "paid to the surrogate" plus a reasonable attorneys' fee. See An-
drews, Proposed State Laws, supra note 9, at 37. See generally Comment, supra note 24, at
421-22.
84. See, e.g., In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128, 1143 (N.J. Super.
Ct. Ch. Div. 1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. A-39-87 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988); Annas,
Protecting Liberty, supra note 5, at 1213; Brophy, supra note 12, at 282-83; Sappideen, The
Surrogate Mother-A Growing Problem, 6 U. NEW S. WALEs L.J. 79, 89-90 (1983).
85. Brophy, supra note 12, at 283.
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raises, at a minimum, difficult issues under the surrogacy contract
itself. In particular, what consequences will flow from a surrogate's
refusal to abide by these terms of the contract? May the biological
father treat her refusal as a breach? If so, may he terminate the
contract? Will he be entitled to restitution of all payments made
before the breach? May he obtain specific performance?
The answer to these questions turns on the legality and en-
forceability of the medical care provisions." The surrogacy con-
tract has been described as containing many "gentlemen's agree-
ments '87 of doubtful enforceability. But in suggesting the form a
uniform state surrogacy statute might take, one commentator has
stated that "[t]he availability of specific performance to enforce
the surrogate's agreement to follow reasonable medical instructions
and to abstain from behaviors harmful to the child's prenatal
health. . . is essential to this Act's provisions."88 Another author
has observed that, "when there is potential harm to the child and
small burden to the surrogate, a court might enforce this [medical
care] provision."' 9
The Baby M trial opinion appeared to adopt these views. Ad-
mittedly, as to all contract issues that the court addressed-the
existence of a contract; its enforceability; the criteria, means, and
manner of enforcement-the court acknowledged that its opinion
"constitute[s] commentary." 90 Although its comments on the con-
tract issues may have been dicta, they were far from obiter. The
opinion very deliberately moved beyond the issue of the best inter-
ests of the child and mapped out a virtual manifesto for the prac-
tice of surrogacy in New Jersey. It expansively concluded that sur-
86. The term "medical care provisions" will be used throughout the article as a short-
hand reference to all provisions in surrogacy contracts that purport to obligate the surrogate
mother to consult a physician, to submit to diagnostic testing, apd to follow the recommen-
dations of her obstetrician with respect to treatment decisions, including medical or surgical
interventions. While the argument has been made that treatment and diagnosis stand on
different ethical and legal planes, see Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of
Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L REV. 405, 443-50 (1983), both involve
invasions of bodily integrity that require justification.
87. See Brophy, supra note 12, at 264; Note, supra note 25, at 1285.
88. Note, supra note 25, at 1306-07 (emphasis added). See also id. at 1310 ("If it is to
be effective, a surrogate parenthood statute must make specific performance available.").
But see Model Human Reproductive Technologies and Surrogacy Act, 72 IowA L REv. 943,
960-62 (1987) (Section 3-101 of the Model Act holds the birth mother responsible for mak-
ing health care decisions concerning both herself and her fetus).
89. Coleman, supra note 35, at 86. Contra Capron, supra note 3, at 696.
90. In re Baby "M", 217 N.J. Super. 313, 525 A.2d 1128, 1132 (N.J. Super. Ct. Ch. Div.
1987), aff'd in part and rev'd in part, No. A-39-87 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988).
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rogate contracts are legal and enforceable in New Jersey, with the
exception noted above"' of the provisions limiting the surrogate
mother's right to an abortion.2 The court did not consider, and
made no exception for, the medical care provisions in the contract.
Because the court was aware of the existence of those provisions in
the surrogacy contract,93 the court presumably intended to make
no exception for them.
Various courts and commentators have expressed their opin-
ion that traditional equity powers, combined with the state's pow-
ers of parens patriae or other state interest in preserving fetal life,
are broad enough to include the power to authorize medical or sur-
gical treatments to be performed on a pregnant woman despite her
refusal to consent.94 More fundamentally, however, there is also
the question of the obligation of the surrogate's physician to his or
her patient. Section B of this article discusses the significance of
the contract for the physician-patient relationship. The role of the
courts in dealing with a surrogate's refusal to consent to treatment
is discussed in Section C.
B. The Surrogate and Her Physician
In discussing the source and extent of a surrogate mother's
right to refuse medical treatment, the starting point is the doctrine
of informed consent. As Angela Holder has written, "It is a funda-
mental principle of our legal system that all persons have the right
to make major decisions involving their bodies."9" The source of
that principle may be found in the existence of a fiduciary relation-
ship between the medical professional and the layperson, or per-
haps in the rights of self-determination, autonomy, and privacy
that every competent adult patient enjoys. As a matter of legal
right, the principle was given early and influential expression in
Justice Cardozo's well-known opinion in Schloendorff v. Society of
New York Hospital:9 "Every human being of adult years and
sound mind has a right to determine what shall be done with his
own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation without his
patient's consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in
91. Refer to supra text accompanying notes 43-45.
92. In re Baby "M", 525 A.2d at 1159.
93. Id. at 1143.
94. Refer to notes 138-58 infra and accompanying text.
95. A. HOLDER, MEDICAL MALPRACTICE LAW 225 (2d ed. 1978).




The legal requirement aside for a moment, informed consent
nourishes not only the physician's identity as a professional but
also the patient's autonomy and rights of self-determination and
privacy. Informed consent also enhances the practice of medicine
itself by respecting the patient's right to participate in making de-
cisions about her own health care. As Lori Andrews has argued,
informed consent "may improve the quality of medical care" in at
least three ways. 8 First, the sharing of information and decisional
authority reduces fear and stress, improves the patient's capacity
to adjust and cope with recuperation, and may reduce the level of
pain medication and number of days of hospitalization required.""
Second, informed consent provides an opportunity for the patient
to reject unnecessary or inappropriate care.100 Third, by requiring
the physician to articulate the patient's choices for alternative
treatments and describe the relative risks and benefits of each, the
physician's own decision making may be improved. 10 1
To be sure, the scope and limits of the doctrine of informed
consent can be difficult to discern. The doctrine is riddled with
fact-dependent limitations, and medical decision making during a
pregnancy is a uniquely complex matter. Recognizing that the
question of exceptions and limitations will need to be separately
considered, the principle itself may be stated simply: for the pa-
tient who is pregnant, informed consent is obviously no less a re-
quirement, and no less important an aspect of patient care, than it
is for the patient who is not.10 2
What makes a surrogate pregnancy different from the usual
97. Id. at 129-30, 105 N.E. at 93.
98. Andrews, Informed Consent Statutes and the Decisionmahing Process, 5 J. LEGAL
MED. 163, 165-71 (1984)[hereinafter Andrews, Consent Statutes].
99. Id. at 165.
100. Id. at 168-69.
101. Id. at 170.
102. See generally Ballard v. Anderson, 4 Cal. 3d 873, 484 P.2d 1345, 95 Cal. Rptr. 1
(1971)(allowing minor women to obtain therapeutic abortions without obtaining parental
consent); Public Health Trust v. Valcin, 507 So. 2d 596 (Fla. 1987)(action against public
hospital for failing to apprise woman of risks of tubal pregnancy after tubal ligation sur-
gery);'Siemieniec v. Lutheran Gen. Hosp., 117 IlL 2d 230, 512 N.E.2d 691 (1987)(wrongful
life action in which parents sought damages for failure of physician to inform mother of risk
her child would be born a hemophiliac); Rhoden, Informed Consent in Obstetrics: Some
Special Problems, 9 W. NEw ENG. L RaV. 67 (1987) [hereinafter Rhoden, Consent in Obstet-
rics](a pregnant woman is in a vulnerable position, often compelled to consent to risky or
unwise treatment out of concern for her baby's welfare).
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case is the presence of the contract itself, and the inclusion of a
provision by which the surrogate mother purports to consent to
reasonable or necessary medical treatment. For a number of rea-
sons, however, the doctrine of informed consent provides no justifi-
cation for a doctor to perform invasive and inherently risky inter-
ventions on a surrogate mother who objects to a diagnostic test or
course of treatment.
The "consent" contained in the surrogacy contract is not "in-
formed" in any meaningful sense. Because it is given before the
artificial insemination and before the advent of the medical condi-
tion for which intervention is proposed, the surrogate's consent is
hopelessly abstracted from medical reality-including the risks
and potential benefits of the intervention itself. Seemingly no
amount of counseling by physicians and psychologists, weeks or
even months before the surrogate is confronted with the choice,
could prepare her to make a meaningful choice, even before she
has become pregnant. As the President's Commission for the
Study of Ethical Problems in Medicine and Biomedical and Be-
havioral Research has noted, advance consent is "lacking in one
important attribute: active, contemporaneous personal choice." 10 3
A physician who ignores the contemporaneous personal choices of
a patient denies her autonomy, precludes her active participation
in her own health care, denies her the medical benefits that may
result from that active participation, 10 4 and, as Professor Katz has
asserted, may also commit an act of psychological abandonment of
the patient.10 5 The common wisdom that we cannot know how we
would respond to a difficult choice until we actually are faced with
the need to choose deserves to be respected in the context of
surrogacy. l0 6
103. 1 PRESIDENT'S COMM'N FOR THE STUDY OF ETHICAL PRO3LEMS IN MEDICINE AND
BIOMEDICAL AND BEHAVIORAL RESEARCH, MAKING HEALTH CARE DECISIONS 50 (1982). The
Commission limits its approval of such advance consents to those that are made by the
patient in anticipation of her incapacitation because of disease or the use of a general anes-
thetic. Id. at 49.
104. Refer to notes 95-101 supra and accompanying text.
105. J. KATZ, supra note 1, at 208-12.
106. The New Jersey Supreme Court's opinion in Baby M recognizes this principle.
The court criticized the surrogate's contractual consent to surrender custody in terms that
are equally applicable to the consent to medical treatment:
Under the contract, the natural mother is irrevocably committed before she
knows the strength of her bond with her child. She never makes a totally volun-
tary, informed decision, for quite clearly any decision prior to the baby's birth is,
in the most important sense, uninformed, and any decision after that, compelled
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Even if the surrogate mother's contractual consent is deemed
to be effective consent at the time it is given, her later objection to
a particular intervention can only be seen as a withdrawal of that
consent. And once consent has been revoked, it may no longer be
relied upon by the treating physician.107 Thus, the consent found
in the surrogate contract is a fiction in every sense, if not at the
time it is made then at least once the surrogate mother states her
objection to the proposed diagnostic procedure or course of
treatment.
Any argument that the surrogate mother has contractually
waived her right to informed consent is also flawed. Although it is
sometimes observed that patients may waive their right to in-
formed consent,108 at least in some jurisdictions,109 what patients
actually waive is their right to be informed or, as Professor
Hagman put it, "the right to know the truth."' 1 0 In such a situa-
tion, the patient gives her physician "carte blanche by saying, 'You
are the doctor, do anything that needs doing and tell me only what
you want to.' -"' This sort of statement contains two separate pro-
positions: a waiver of the right to know, and a consent to treatment
that "needs" to be done. Just as that consent should not be con-
strued as permission to perform an unnecessary or unreasonably
dangerous intervention, it should also not be treated as irrevocable.
Once the patient makes it clear that she has taken back the blank
check and does not consent to a particular intervention, the waiver
by a pre-existing contractual commitment, the threat of a lawsuit, and the induce-
ment of a $10,000 payment, is less than totally voluntary.
In re Baby "M," No. A-39-87, slip op. at 45 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988).
107. See, e.g., CtA. WEUFE & INsrr. CODE §§ 5326.2 (g), 5326.7(d) (West 1984);
Valcin v. Public Health Trust, 437 So. 2d 1297, 1301 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1985); Mims v.
Boland, 110 Ga. App. 477, 483, 138 S.E.2d 902, 907 (1964); Rogers v. Commissioner of Dep't
of Health, 390 Mass. 489, 458 N.E.2d 308, 314 n.U (1983); In re Visbeck, 210 N.J. Super.
527, 510 A.2d 125, 129 (1986); Pugsley v. Privitte, 220 Va. 892, 263 S.E.2d 69, 74 (1980); In
re Grant, 109 Wash. 2d 545, 747 P.2d 445, 456 (1988) (en banc).
108. See Andrews, Consent Statutes, supra note 98, at 178.
109. See ALASKA STAT. § 09.55.556(b)(2) (1983); Dm. CODE ANN. tt. 18, § 6852(b)(2)
(Supp. 1986); N.Y. Pun. HmALTH LAW § 2805-d(4)(b) (McKinney 1987); OR. Rnv. STAT. §
677.097(2) (1987); UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-14-5(2)(c) (1977); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 12, §
1909(c)(2) (Supp. 1987); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 7.70.060(2) (Supp. 1987); Cobbs v. Grant,
8 Cal. 3d 229, 245, 502 P.2d 1, 12, 104 Cal. Rptr. 505, 516 (1972) (dicta); Sard v. Hardy, 281
Md. 432, 379 A.2d 1014, 1022 (1977) (dicta).
110. Hagman, The Medical Patient's Right to Know: Report on a Medical-Legal-Eth-
ical, Empirical Study, 17 UCLA L. Rav. 758, 785 (1970).
111. Id.
1988]
HOUSTON LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:599
(if any) can provide the physician no basis for proceeding.'
Despite these objections to relying upon the surrogate's sup-
posed consent to future obstetrical interventions, a physician (or
court) might be persuaded that the surrogate had nonetheless sold
her right to object as part of her bartered-for exchange with the
biological father. In addition to obvious concerns that judicial en-
forcement of such a contractual arrangement would violate the
thirteenth amendment's prohibition of all forms of forced servi-
tude, 113 attempts to give effect to the medical care provisions
would also present great practical difficulties of interpretation.
Even more significantly, these difficulties are also present when
neither physician nor biological father seeks to compel the surro-
gate mother to accept medical treatment, but the father merely
112. Cf. Note, supra note 35, at 1941 (an effective waiver is produced only "when the
permission and the infringement occur at the same time"). Professor Katz' position on pa-
tient waivers lends some support to the suggestion in the text. In his view, "[a] patient's
waiver of the physician's obligation to disclose and obtain the patient's consent should be
accepted only after a committed effort has been made to explore the underlying reasons for
the patient's abdication of decision-making responsibility." J. KATZ, supra note 1, at 125.
The patient's abdication is not to be accepted at face value, but instead is a problem to be
worked through to help the patient regain her role as an active participant in the decisions
concerning her health care.
The relatively vague and potentially unbounded consent form that is presented to sur-
gical patients as part of their admission to the hospital provides a serviceable analogy. A
standard admissions form propounded by the American Medical Association in 1961 read as
follows: "I consent to the performance of operations and procedures in addition to or differ-
ent from those now contemplated, whether or not arising from presently unforeseen condi-
tions, which the above-named doctor or his associates or assistants may consider necessary
or advisable in the course of the operation." Hagman, supra note 110, at 786 (quoting
A.M.A., LAW DEP'T, MEDICOLEGAL FORMS, FORM 16 (1961)). The form raises questions con-
cerning the kinds of information that should be communicated to a patient before she signs
it. Even assuming, however, that the form was presented under circumstances that would
render it a valid consent, the A.M.A. itself recognized that the consent did not authorize
procedures as to which the patient has stated her "clearly specific prohibitions." Id. (quot-
ing A.M.A., LAw DEP'T, MEDICOLEOAL FORMS, FORM 22 (1961)).
113. See U.S. CONST. amend. XIII ("Neither slavery nor involuntary servitude, except
as a punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly convicted, shall exist
within the United States, or any place subject to their jurisdiction."). See Peonage Abolition
Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1994 (1982). The fact that a servitude began voluntarily and by contract
does not save it from invalidity. See United States v. Reynolds, 235 U.S. 133, 149-50 (1914);
State v. Oliva, 144 La. 51, 52-53, 80 So. 195, 196 (1918). This argument has been advanced
as a ground for invalidating the abortion provisions of surrogacy arrangements. See Com-
ment, Surrogate Mother Agreements: Contemporary Legal Aspects of a Biblical Notion, 16
U. RICH. L. REV. 467, 476-77 (1982).
One student commentator, however, has questioned the applicability of the thirteenth
amendment to an essentially, although artificially, familial relationship such as surrogacy,
and has argued that the constitutionally protected right to privacy provides a more appro-
priate analytical frame. See Note, supra note 35, at 1937-38, 1946-49.
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seeks to determine whether the surrogate's refusal to submit to a
particular treatment constitutes a violation of the contract.
One problem is that the lack of precision in the surrogate con-
tract's medical care provisions makes the surrogate's consent to
treatment vague and indeterminate and, thus, potentially very
broad. The range of tests and interventions includes Cesarean sec-
tions, cerclage, blood transfusions to the mother, maternal drug
therapy, in utero diagnostic techniques (such as ultrasonography
and amniocentesis), intra-amniotic instillation of drugs, blood
transfusions into the peritoneal cavity of the fetus, fetal blood
transfusions, and fetal surgery.11 4 The language of the contract
provides no basis for distinguishing among the many forms of ob-
stetrical diagnosis and treatment.
This lack of precision invites disputes over interpretation.
What is a "medically reasonable" instruction or intervention? If an
instruction or proposed intervention is "unreasonable," it presum-
ably need not be followed, and if the surrogate refuses she will not
be in breach, but how is the surrogate to know?115
If these concerns involved difficulties of "mere" interpretation,
they might not be seen as all that serious. The issues of appropri-
ate treatment and the scope of consent may well arise, however,
more often than will the dispute over custody that was at the heart
of the Baby M case. Objections to medical advice, treatment or
intervention can foreseeably be made by surrogate mothers who in-
tend to go ahead with the arrangement and deliver the child to the
biological father, as well as by surrogate mothers who decide dur-
ing gestation that they want to cancel the contract and keep the
114. Cesarean sections involve significant risk of mortality or morbidity to the mother,
because they are major surgery and require anesthesia (most often general, although spinal
and epidural anesthesia may also be used). Although surgery on the fetus in utero presents
comparable risks to the mother, Cesarean sections are indicated much more frequently than
fetal surgery. For a helpful discussion of the medical aspects of the Cesarean section see
Rhoden, The Judge in the Delivery Room: The Emergence of Court-Ordered Cesoreans, 74
CALis. L REv. 1951, 1954-58 (1986)[hereinafter Rhoden, Judge in Delivery Room]. For use-
ful discussions of the procedures mentioned in the text, see the discussion in Blank, Emerg-
ing Notions of Women's Rights and Responsibilities During Gestation, 7 J. LEGAL IED.
441, 452-64 (1986); Nelson, Buggy & Weil, Forced Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women:
"Compelling Each to Live as Seems Good to the Rest," 37 HASrN'cs LJ. 703, 708-11 (1986);
Comment, A Maternal Duty to Protect Fetal Health?, 58 IND. L.J. 531, 531-34 (1983).
115. Chances are the surrogate's decision whether to submit to an intervention or fol-
low an instruction will be based on factors other than her interpretation of the con-
tract-her own weighing of the risks and benefits (to herself and the child), religious convic-




Moreover, the problem of interpreting the contract language is
not a simple matter of divining the parties' intent or arriving at a
position that is consistent with the purposes of the agreement. The
interpretive problem is complicated because the meaning of the
surrogacy contract's terms will be determined simultaneously from
three perspectives: the surrogate mother, the biological father, and
the attending physician.
It is not difficult to see that the surrogate and the father could
well have very different perspectives as to the appropriateness of
medical advice, treatment, or interventions. The father's interest is
principally, if not exclusively, in the well-being of the child and in
maximizing the prospects for the delivery of a healthy baby. The
child's health is, of course, a function of the mother's well-being;
the contract itself recognizes that fact by requiring the surrogate to
maintain a healthy lifestyle. Yet the surrogate's health is simply
the means to the end desired by the biological father, not an inde-
pendent goal the father can be expected to value for its own sake.
He will be likely to view the risks that an intervention poses to the
mother's health in a far different light than the mother herself will.
By contrast, the surrogate's perspective is, at first glance, the
same as for any pregnant woman: a difficult mixture of altruistic
concern for the child she is carrying and concern for her own well-
being. But the nature of surrogacy may also complicate the picture
for her because, while the child is genetically related to her, the
child is also one whom the surrogate is contractually obligated to
surrender-that is, one whom the surrogate has agreed never to see
again. Suppose the surrogate mother's choice is between risking
her own life by submitting to an aggressive and risky intervention
to save the fetus, on the one hand, and refusing to submit to it on
the other hand, thereby increasing the chances of mortality or
morbidity for the child at birth. A difficult decision for many preg-
nant women faced with that choice could be even more so for a
surrogate.
The third perspective from which the contract language will
be viewed is, of course, that of the surrogate mother's obstetrician.
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As Professor Nancy Rhoden11 and others1 7 have persuasively ar-
gued, the obstetrician's situation embodies its own set of conflicts,
because the obstetrician arguably has two separate patients: the
mother and the child. When the mother defines her own self-inter-
est in terms of bringing a healthy baby to full term, the potential
for conflict is academic. When, on the other hand, the welfare of
the fetus can be advanced only at some risk to the mother, the
obstetrician's dilemma becomes apparent, especially when the
mother is not ill and the medical condition for which treatment is
proposed is the fetus's alone. A third source of conflict for obstetri-
cians is their own self-interest as it is manifested in a fear of legal
liability for failing to do everything possible to prevent injury to or
the death of the child."'
The conflict for the obstetrician with two patients, and the
barriers to achieving empathy with the pregnant woman, are well
illustrated by a recent national survey of the heads of all fellow-
ship programs in maternal-fetal medicine and directors of mater-
nal-fetal medicine divisions in residency programs in obstetrics
and gynecology.119 Nearly half of the responding physicians be-
lieved "that mothers who refused medical advice and thereby en-
dangered the life of the fetus should be detained in hospitals or
other facilities so that compliance could be ensured."12 The survey
results provide a chilling example of a sort of double effect 2 1 that
116. Rhoden, Consent in Obstetrics, supra note 102, at 76; Rhoden, Judge in Delivery
Room, supra note 114, at 1972.
117. E.g., Nelson, Buggy & Well, supra note 114, at 716-21; Nelson & Milliken, Com-
pelled Medical Treatment of Pregnant Women: Life, Liberty, and Law in Conflict, 259 J.
A.M.A. 1060, 1060-61 (1988).
118. See Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interventions, 316
NEw ENG. J. MED. 1192, 1195 (1987) [hereinafter Court Ordered Interventions); Rhoden,
Judge in Delivery Room, supra note 114, at 2021.
119. See Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 118. The net response rate of the
two groups to the authors' questionnaire was 83%. The respondents represented 45 states
and the District of Columbia. Id. at 1192.
120. Id. at 1193 (46% supported involuntary detention).
121. The term "double effect" is used here not so much in its technical sense as to
suggest the ethical problem of consciously permitting an evil effect (i.e., negating the preg-
nant woman's autonomous right to self-determination) in order to achieve a good effect
(promoting the health or preserving the life of a fetus). This formulation concededly makes
some key, and debatable, assumptions. Among them are: (1) that the mother's autonomy is
or should be unbounded, or at least that it includes the right to make a medical decision for
herself that precludes an intervention needed for the fetus, and (2) that preserving fetal life
is a good effect or, more to the point, that exposing a fetus to a higher risk of mortality or
morbidity by withholding treatment rises to a level of gravity that is proportionate to the
denial of the mother's autonomy. A useful survey of the principle of double effect is May,
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can begin to operate on the obstetrician's two-patient dilemma.
Once the physician views the fetus as a patient, it becomes easier
to treat the mother as if she were a child. This transformation of
the obstetrician's relationship with both patients is encapsulated
by this article's introductory quotation from William Carlos Wil-
liams. The obstetrician's role is redefined as one of protecting the
pregnant woman, her child, and society from the woman's "idiocy."
Professor Rhoden has observed that "no doctor can fully em-
brace and accept a patient's feelings . ..the barriers to achieving
at least empathy are higher than usual in obstetrics." '122 The po-
tential for conflict is significant "even if the doctor and the woman
share similar values.' 123 The barriers to achieving empathy are un-
doubtedly even more significant when the mother is a surrogate,
someone whose motivations and decisions are likely to be at least
unfamiliar, and perhaps even distasteful, to the obstetrician. 24
Moreover, the ethical bind in which the surrogate's obstetrician is
placed is made particularly acute because a third person, the natu-
ral father, is paying the obstetrician's fee, receiving information
about the medical condition of the surrogate and the fetus, and
claiming a right under the contract to participate in and even con-
trol the medical decision making of the surrogate and her physi-
cian. If there is, as Professor Rhoden concludes, "reason to be pro-
foundly pessimistic about the chances for shared decisionmaking
in obstetrics,' 2 5 the pessimism should be even darker for the pros-
pects of shared decision making during a surrogate pregnancy.
To some, these concerns may seem a bit overdrawn. After all,
when confronted with a stark conflict between the welfare of a fe-
Double Effect, 1 ENCYCLOPEDIA OF BIOETHICS 316 (Reich ed. 1978).
122. Rhoden, Consent in Obstetrics, supra note 102, at 77.
123. Id. at 79. In Professor Rhoden's view, doctors are more likely than mothers to be
influenced by their view of medical uncertainty (i.e., the possibility that "the baby will be
fine, or at least do better than expected"), the availability of technology that they have been
trained (through education and socialization) to use, and the specter of legal liability for
failing to use all available means to lessen or avoid the impairment of the child. Id.
124. The "Recommendations of the American College of Obstetricians and Gynecolo-
gists Concerning Surrogate Mothering" states that "a woman [who] seeks medical care for
an established pregnancy, regardless of the method of conception. . . should be cared for as
any other obstetric patient or referred to a qualified physician who will provide that care."
Smith, supra note 35, at 665. The statement implicitly recognizes that not all obstetricians
will be able to overcome their personal feelings toward a surrogate mother, but it perhaps
too naively suggests that obstetricians with those feelings will recognize them and take cor-
rective action.
125. Rhoden, Consent in Obstetrics, supra note 102, at 87.
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tus and the objections of the mother to a proposed intervention,
most physicians are unlikely to risk incurring tort liability by per-
forming the unconsented-to procedure. Further, Professor Rhoden
has opined "that a physician is relatively unlikely to go to court to
attempt to force treatment in a crisis situation where the fetus'
chances, even with treatment, appear seriously compromised," 2 '
although "[i]f [they] believe that with the treatment the child can
be fine, they are increasingly apt to challenge the woman's decision
in court. 127 Short of either of these alternatives, however, physi-
cians may significantly affect their patients' choice of health care
options by the manner in which the options are presented and
explained.
A patient's resistance, and even objections, to a diagnostic
procedure or course of treatment can be influenced or silenced by
subtle shadings of a physician's intonation, volume, and facial ex-
pressions, to say nothing of the way the physician expresses the
alternative outcomes and risks. Within the "silent world of doctor
and patient,"128 this unspoken and sometimes subconscious at-
tempt to overcome the will of the patient is as much a threat to
professional values as overtly disregarding the patient's objections.
This is perhaps the most invidious response to the surrogate's
refusal to consent to an intervention for the benefit of the fetus:
"invidious" because it is shrouded in secrecy and may not be de-
tectable to the patient whose attention and emotions interfere with
any objective assessment of the physician's demeanor. An applica-
tion to a court for an injunction may not produce a proceeding,
opinion, or order that is a model of analytical clarity, 129 but at least
126. Id. at 81.
127. Id. at 82. Professor Rhoden's conclusions concerning the unwillingness of obste-
tricians to incur tort liability or to seek a court order against a resistant mother seem intui-
tively correct. If the survey results discussed in text accompanying notes 119-20 supra are
any indication, obstetricians' attitudes may be changing, and the change could make them
more willing in the future to challenge the medical decisions of pregnant women.
128. The phrase, of course, is from the title of Professor Katz' classic study, in which
the nuances of the doctor-patient relationship are played out against the backdrop of in-
formed consent. J. KArz, supra note 1.
129. Deliberation and reasoned elaboration are admittedly not the norm in these
cases. In most cases in which a court order to compel an obstetrical intervention is sought,
"hospital administrators and lawyers often have little forewarning of impending conflicts"
and "[j]udges, unfortunately, have even less time for deliberation." Court-Ordered Inter-
ventions, supra note 118, at 1195. The two reported cases in which court-ordered Cesareans
have been upheld on appeal illustrate the speed with which such cases go through the judi-
cial system. See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987) (application to trial court for declara-
tory order on June 16; telephonic hearing in Court of Appeals conducted and motion for
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the legal proceeding provides a forum and an opportunity for the
interests of the mother to be heard and evaluated, and for the con-
flicting values to be aired and resolved. This is not to say that the
involvement of the courts is particularly to be welcomed when a
conflict surfaces between the surrogate and her physician. But, un-
like the private decisions and actions of a physician, a court's rea-
soning and result can be subjected to the scrutiny of the patient,
her family, and the medical and legal communities. The more sub-
tle control of the patient's will that can be exercised in a hospital
room or doctor's office is not nearly as public, nor is it subject to
the moderating influences of the requirement of reasoned
elaboration.
C. The Surrogate and the Courts
A surrogate mother's refusal to follow her obstetrician's rec-
ommendations, or refusal to consent to a diagnostic test or other
intervention that her doctor deems "reasonable" for the preserva-
tion of fetal health or life, would raise a host of difficult legal is-
sues. If the surrogate's refusal can be shown to have proximately
caused a miscarriage, stillbirth, or birth defect, the principal legal
issues concern: (1) the surrogate's liability to the father for his un-
fulfilled expectations; (2) the placement of the child (with the sur-
rogate? the father and his wife? a third party or agency?); and (3)
responsibility for the child's support, including special medical
care needs. Recent commentators have remarked that these "con-
cerns [are] difficult to resolve"'130 and that "[e]xisting law does not
address the issues of the surrogate's liability or acceptable reme-
stay denied on same day); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274
S.E.2d 457, 458-60 (1981) (petition for order filed in trial court and granted on January 22;
Georgia Department of Human Resources petition for temporary custody of unborn child
filed on same day; temporary custody petition granted January 23; motion for stay of both
orders filed with Supreme Court on January 23; oral argument conducted and motion for
stay denied on same day); Daniels, Court-Ordered Cesareans: A Growing Concern for Indi-
gent Women, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 1064, 1068 (1988) (discussing an unreported case in
Colorado in which the court-ordered C-section was performed within six and one-half hours
after the mother's initial refusal of treatment). See also Annas, She's Going to Die: The
Case of Angela C, HASTINoS CENTER REP., Feb.-Mar. 1988, at 23, 25 (as a rule trial judges
should never go to the hospital for a hearing except "to determine the competency of the
patient"). In individual cases, therefore, it may be unrealistic to hope for reasoned decision
making. This does not necessarily mean, however, that the legal process does not provide at
least a marginally improved prospect for a rational decision.
130. Comment, Surrogate Motherhood: Contractual Issues and Remedies under Leg-
islative Proposals, 23 WASHBURN L.J. 601, 613 (1984).
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dies." '131 Most of the proposed answers to these questions have as-
sumed the existence of valid claims in tort or for breach of con-
tract, with damages assessed to compensate the father for
expenditures made pursuant to contract or to compensate the so-
cial parents for the additional expenditures that will be required to
care for the child in the future. 1
32
The ex post facto legal remedy, however, does not provide a
truly adequate remedy for the damage to the interests of the bio-
logical father and his wife, to say nothing of the injury to the
child' s3 and to society's interest in the birth of live, healthy babies.
Moreover, the damages sought by the natural father may not be
collectible if the surrogate is judgment-proof. Further, a tort action
for damages simply may not be a realistic possibility, given the dif-
ficulty one would expect in many cases of showing that the surro-
gate's breach was the cause of the child's condition. Consequently,
the search for appropriate mechanisms to prevent avoidable mis-
carriages, stillbirths, and birth defects has begun in earnest. Some
commentators have viewed the contract itself as an appropriate
means of avoiding a bad outcome, suggesting that "when there is
potential harm to the child and small burden to the surrogate, a
court might enforce this [medical care] provision."'3
Another form this search has taken is legislation. Following
the New Jersey trial court's decision in Baby M, at least seventy
bills addressing the practice of surrogacy were introduced in state
131. Comment, supra note 24, at 421.
132. See, e.g., Brophy, supra note 12, at 279; Capron, supra note 3, at 696; Comment,
supra note 130, at 634.
133. Few jurisdictions have recognized the existence of a child's cause of action in tort
against his mother for negligent failure to provide an adequate level of prenatal care. In one
of the few reported cases in which such a cause of action has been recognized, a boy sued his
mother for failing to inform her physician that she was taking the antibiotic tetracycline. As
a consequence of her ingestion of that drug, he was born with permanently discolored teeth.
See Grodin v. Grodin, 102 Mich. App. 396, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870 (1980). In addition, the
application of criminal child abuse laws to "fetal abuse" by a pregnant woman has been
endorsed by some writers and unsuccessfully attempted in a widely reported California
prosecution. No state has yet enacted a statute that explicitly criminalizes fetal abuse. See
Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Criminalization of "Fetal
Abuse," 101 HRv. L REv. 994, 995 (1988).
134. Coleman, Surrogate Motherhood: Analysis of the Problems and Suggestions for
Solutions, 50 TENN. L REv. 71, 86 (1982). See also Eaton, Comparative Responses to Surro-
gate Motherhood, 65 NEn. L l~v. 686, 720 (1986) ("If the provision protects a child late in




legislatures around the country.13 5 While a majority of the pending
bills recognize the surrogate mother's right to decide whether to
have an abortion and to make health care decisions as she sees
fit,'36 others would impose a statutory obligation on the surrogate
mother to have regularly scheduled medical examinations, to fol-
low medical instructions to protect maternal and fetal health, or to
submit to the reasonable medical requests of the natural father
and his wife. 3 7 The passage of these bills would provide statutory
support for the notion that the medical care provisions in surro-
gacy contracts should be subject to court ordered performance.
A third basis for judicially compelled obstetrical interventions
exists quite apart from legislative innovations and the surrogate
contract itself. Increasingly, state courts have been asked to order
pregnant women to submit to medical treatment, and in the major-
ity of cases, the courts have granted the request."3 8 A recent survey
in the New England Journal of Medicine reported that between
1981 and 1986, medical institutions filed thirty-six applications for
court orders in eighteen states and the District of Columbia. Ex-
cluding the fifteen requests to compel maternal transfusions after
birth, seventeen of the remaining twenty-one requests were
135. See Peterson, Legislatures Facing Variety of Bills To Regulate Surrogate Moth-
erhood, N.Y. Times, Dec. 13, 1987 § 1, at 42, col. 3.
136. See Andrews, Proposed State Laws, supra note 9, at 37.
137. Id. (describing bills pending in the District of Columbia, Maryland, New Jersey,
New York, and South Carolina).
138. The trend toward greater state intervention, in the form of prenatal interventions
and the imposition of postbirth criminal or civil sanctions for exposing the child to unrea-
sonable prenatal risks, has been described in the recent literature. See, e.g., Blank, supra
note 114 (discussing tendency in tort law to view fetus as person); Johnsen, A New Threat
to Pregnant Women's Autonomy, HASTINGS CENTER REP., Aug./Sept. 1987, at 33 [hereinaf-
ter Johnsen, New Threat] (criticizing recent court and legislative decisions requiring women
to take certain actions in pregnancy); Rhoden, Judge in Delivery Room, supra note 114, at
1951, 1986-89 (discussing implications of judge-ordered Ceasarean sections); Lewin, Courts
Acting To Force Care Of the Unborn, N.Y. Times, Nov. 23, 1987, § 1, at 1, col. 1.
Although this article discusses the power of the states to compel a mother to submit to
undesired medical treatment for the benefit of the fetus, the less direct forms of coercion
(post-birth civil and criminal sanctions against the mother for unreasonably refusing a bene-
ficial fetal therapy, for example) may influence her choice as well. See, e.g., Shaw, Condi-
tional Prospective Rights of the Fetus, 5 J. LEGAL MED. 63, 83-104 (1984); Robertson, Pro-
creative Liberty and the Control of Conception, Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REv.
405, 437-42 (1983) [hereinafter Robertson, Procreative Liberty]. Postbirth sanctions have
been criticized as "suffer[ing] from largely the same shortcomings as prebirth seizures."




granted by judges in ten states.139 The orders were for involuntary
Cesarean sections (fifteen requests; thirteen orders granted in ten
states), hospital detentions (three requests; two orders in two
states), and intra-uterine transfusions (three requests; two
orders). 140
The figures reported in this survey offer dramatic evidence of
a growing willingness of state courts to grant requests for compul-
sory obstetrical interventions. The survey also showed that obste-
tricians themselves are similarly inclined: nearly half of the re-
sponding physicians agreed that potentially life-saving procedures,
such as intra-uterine transfusions, should be compelled by court
order when the mother did not consent.1 4 1 The significance of these
figures cannot be underestimated. The legal and medical profes-
sions are experiencing a marked shift in the way they view the sta-
tus of pregnant women, "a shift away from the traditional notion
of the fetus as an integral part of the pregnant woman, with the
woman controlling the decisions concerning her own and her fe-
tus's well-being"142 to a view "that treat[s] the maternal-fetal rela-
tionship as it does the conflicts between two distinct and indepen-
dent entities. '143
139. See Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 118, at 1192-93. The ten states
were Colorado, Hawaii, Illinois, Michigan, Minnesota, Ohio, Pennsylvania, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Texas. The requests for court orders were reported by respondents to a
nation-wide survey of leading obstetricians. Id. In addition to the requests reported by the
obstetricians, at least three other requests were made during the survey period, one of which
was granted and affirmed on appeal. See Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth.,
247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457, 460 (1981) (Cesarean section ordered by trial court, affirmed by
the Georgia Supreme Court); Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395, 397 (1983) (pro-
bate and family court judge ordered a woman to submit to a "purse string" operation in
order "to hold [her] pregnancy," vacated by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court);
Kolder, Gallagher & Parsons, supra note 138, at 1196 n.23 (citing Gallagher, The Fetus and
the Law-Whose Life Is It Anyway?, Ms, Sept. 1984, at 62).
More recently, the District of Columbia became the twelfth jurisdiction to grant an
order compelling a woman to undergo an unwanted Cesarean section, which it did on two
occasions in 1987. See In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 613 (D.C. 1987) (terminally ill cancer pa-
tient in 26th week of pregnancy ordered to undergo Cesarean; affirmed by Court of Ap-
peals); id. at 613 & n.1 (abnormally long labor at the end of full-term pregnancy, Court of
Appeals affirmed trial court's order directing "hospital [to] take steps to 'protect the birth
and safety of the fetus,' including a Caesarean section if necessary").
140. See Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 118, at 1192-93.
141. See id. at 1192 (47% favored court-ordered obstetrical interventions when the life
of the fetus is endangered). The attitudes surveyed in the article are more crudely revealed
in the telling title of a recent article. See Feldman, Leading Them to Water and Making
Them Drink, 13 LEGAL ASPECTS OF MED. PRAc. 1 (1985).
142. Johnsen, New Threat, supra note 138, at 33, 35.
143. Id.
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Ironically, the fetal rights doctrine has an ambiguous, even in-
consistent, relationship with the practice of surrogacy. Even if sur-
rogacy arrangements do not violate existing prohibitions against
baby selling, they cannot entirely escape the charge of womb leas-
ing and, perhaps more seriously, of treating babies as commodities.
Nothing could be more antithetical to the notion of fetal rights
than a practice that treats fetuses and infants as the proper objects
of commerce and trade. At the same time, the notion that the fetus
has a right to life and to medical treatment provides the justifica-
tion for compelled obstetrical interventions and is entirely consis-
tent with the contractual waiver or assignment of a surrogate
mother's right to object to medical treatment for the fetus she
carries.
The increasingly accepted shift in values toward a recognition
of fetal rights asks physicians and courts to weigh the pregnant
woman's rights of autonomous self-determination against the
state's interest in preserving fetal life. For example, while Profes-
sor John Robertson believes that "pre-birth seizures rarely are
[justifiable], ' 144 he does not rule them out.145 Professor Robertson
has argued that the appropriateness of compulsory obstetrical in-
terventions should depend upon three factors: the risk to the
mother's health (or, the degree of intrusiveness, which should be
comparable to the risk in most cases); whether the intervention
benefits only the fetus or the mother as well; and the viability of
the fetus.146 He states that before the fetus reaches viability, "a
court should not order ...more than minimal bodily intrusions
for the unborn child's sake, 1 47 while after viability "more intrusive
144. Robertson, Correspondence to the Editor, Court-Ordered Obstetrical Interven-
tions, 317 NEw ENG. J. MED. 1223 (1987)[hereinafter Robertson, Correspondence].
145. Professor Robertson has also argued in favor of indirect limits on maternal deci-
sion making by imposing postnatal civil sanctions against the mother who fails to take rea-
sonable steps to ensure the health of the newborn:
The mother has, if she conceives and chooses not to abort, a legal and moral
duty to bring the child into the world as healthy as is reasonably possible. She has
a duty to avoid actions or omissions that will damage the fetus and child, just as
she has a duty to protect the child's welfare once it is born until she transfers this
duty to another. In terms of fetal rights, a fetus has no right to be conceived-or,
once conceived, to be carried to viability. But once the mother decides not to ter-
minate the pregnancy, the viable fetus acquires rights to have the mother conduct
her life in ways that will not injure it.
Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 138, at 438.
146. Id. at 443-47.
147. Id. at 447.
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or risky interventions could be justified. 148 Commentators who are
not categorically opposed to all court-ordered interventions gener-
ally favor a similar balancing test,149 and the reasoning of the few
court decisions on the subject is consistent with this approach.1 0
On the other hand, those who do categorically oppose all court-
ordered obstetrical interventions reject any balancing test that
would allow the mother's rights of autonomy and self-determina-
148. Id.
149. See, e.g., Blank, supra note 114, at 468-69; Shaw, supra note 138, at 83-89; Ma-
thieu, Respecting Liberty and Preventing Harm: Limits of State Intervention in Prenatal
Choice, 8 HARv. JL. & PUB. POL'Y 19, 50-54 (1985).
150. In Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 186, 274 S.E.2d 457,
460 (1981), the Georgia Supreme Court affirmed a lower court order directing that a
Cesarean section be performed on an unwilling mother. While the proposed intervention
was undeniably major surgery, the chances of fetal death without the Cesarean were said to
be 99% and the chances of maternal death were placed at 50%. Id. at 458-59. The Cesarean
was said to offer a nearly 100% chance of survival of both mother and child, and the mother
was in her 39th week of pregnancy. Id.
In Taft v. Taft, 388 Mass. 331, 446 N.E.2d 395 (1983), the Massachusetts Supreme
Judicial Court vacated a lower court order directing a woman to submit to a "purse string"
operation in order "to hold [her] pregnancy." Id. Its ruling, however, was consistent with
Professor Robertson's analysis. The court focused on the lack of expert testimony concern-
ing the nature of the operation, the nature of the risks to the mother and to the unborn
child, and the nature of the benefits of the procedure. Id. at 397.
In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987), presented a more enigmatic fact situation. The
mother was terminally ill with cancer, thus, not only was the intervention not for her bene-
fit, the Court of Appeals admitted that the Cesarean section probably hastened her death by
a few hours. Id. at 613-14. At the same time, the Cesarean posed virtually no risk to the
mother's physical health, because she was already dying, and the procedure offered the only
hope for saving the infant, who died after delivery. Id. at 612. While arguably consistent
with Professor Robertson's proposed analysis of such cases, A.C. is a disturbing case. With a
gestational age of 26 weeks, the fetus' chances of survival were described by hospital officials
as "grim." Id. at 612. Moreover, the mother's deteriorating physical condition had produced
oxygen starvation in the fetus, with an increased risk that the child would be born with
cerebral palsy, neurological defects, deafness, or blindness. Id. at 613. In addition, medica-
tions the mother had been taking throughout her pregnancy increased the risk of poor fetal
health. Id. The intervention, therefore, seems to have been one that increased the fetus'
chances of survival only marginally and with questionable benefits for the newborn's quality
of life. Even more disturbing was the court's willingness to discount the express wishes of
the mother, apparently in the belief that she would not have to live with the physical and
psychological consequences of the compelled intervention for very long, or that she was enti-
tled to less say in the medical decisionmaking for her fetus because of her impending death.
Id. at 617. It has been reported that the baby "lived for two hours" and that the mother
"regained consciousness and cried when she learned that her baby died. She died two days
later." Greenhouse, On Legal Call to Meet Medical Emergencies, N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1988,
at 10, col. 3. See also Annas, supra note 129, at 25 (characterizing the result as forcing the
patient to undergo an unwanted abortion and criticizing the opinion as "cavalierly lawless
and unprincipled").
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tion to be overridden for the benefit of the fetus. 51 While a de-
tailed discussion of the arguments for and against judicially com-
pelled obstetrical interventions is beyond the scope of this article,
a brief summary of the competing positions will illuminate the po-
sition in which surrogates may find themselves if a court order is
sought.
Both the Georgia Supreme Court152 and the District of Colum-
bia Court of Appeals153 have upheld lower court orders directing
that a pregnant woman submit to a Cesarean section against her
will. The courts proceeded from their belief that a viable fetus has
a right to live and the state has an interest in protecting fetal
life.154 The Georgia court based its ruling on Roe v. Wade,15 in
which the Supreme Court stated that the state's compelling inter-
est in the preservation of fetal life would justify the imposition of
limitations on the ability of a pregnant woman to choose to abort
her fetus in the third trimester of pregnancy, including a ban on
abortions except when necessary to save the mother's life. The Dis-
trict of Columbia Court of Appeals, however, did not read Roe as
broadly as the Georgia Supreme Court:
There is a significant difference, however, between a court author-
izing medical treatment for a child already born and a child who
is yet unborn, although the state has compelling interests in pro-
tecting the life and health of both children and viable unborn
151. See, e.g., Annas, Protecting Liberty, supra note 5; Johnsen, New Threat, supra
note 138; Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 118; Nelson, Buggy & Weil, supra note
114; Nelson & Milliken, supra note 117; Rhoden, Judge in Delivery Room, supra note 114;
Note, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Lib-
erty, Privacy, & Equal Protection, 95 YALE L.J. 599, 624-25 (1986). Nancy Gallagher, one of
the co-authors of the New England Journal of Medicine article cited above, probably be-
longs on this list in her own right. Her article in the Harvard Women's Law Journal argues
persuasively against court-ordered interventions and the notion of fetal rights. Although it
concludes with a proposed balancing test, under her test a compelled Cesarean section
would be "as constitutionally impermissible as a state-compelled organ or tissue trans-
plant." Gallagher, Prenatal Invasions & Interventions: What's Wrong With Fetal Rights,
10 HARv. WOMEN's L.J. 9, 55 (1987).
152. Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457
(1981).
153. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611 (D.C. 1987).
154. See id. at 617 (holding the trial court properly subordinated the mother's "right
against bodily intrusion to the interests of the unborn child and the state") (emphasis
added); Jefferson v. Griffin Spalding County Hosp. Auth., 247 Ga. 86, 274 S.E.2d 457, 460
(1981) (denying motion for stay of lower court's order with citation to Roe v. Wade) (Hill,
P.J., concurring) (recognizing the "unborn child's right to live"); id. at 461 (Smith, J., con-
curring) (relying on "the state's compelling interest in preserving the life of [the] fetus").
155. 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
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children. Where birth has occurred, the medical treatment does
not infringe on the mother's right to bodily integrity. With an
unborn child, the state's interest in preserving the health of the
child may run squarely against the mother's interest in her bodily
integrity.1 56
The District of Columbia panel tentatively concluded that the
state has the power to "infringe upon the mother's right to bodily
integrity to protect the life or health of her unborn child [if] to do
so will not significantly affect the health of the mother and. . . the
child has a significant chance of being born alive." 117 It retreated
from this position, however, in the case of forced Cesarean sec-
tions, because of the risks of complications, discomfort, and death.
The court then concluded that the exception for Cesareans (and,
presumably, other interventions posing comparable risks to the
mother's health) did not apply to the case at hand, because the
pregnant woman was a terminal cancer patient with "at best, two
days left of sedated life."15
Academic commentary against forced obstetrical interventions
denies that a fetal right to receive in utero therapy or to birth by
Cesarean section can be justified by the Supreme Court's recogni-
tion in Roe v. Wade of a strong state interest in the preservation of
fetal life.15 The principal argument against a broad reading of Roe
rests upon the Supreme Court's decision to limit the state's power
to prohibit even postviability abortions when an abortion is neces-
sary to protect the pregnant woman's health and life.
The Court recently demonstrated that its holding in Roe was
intended to prevent states from legislating a maternal-fetal trade-
off when to do so would increase the risks to the mother's health.
In Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecolo-
gists, 60 the Supreme Court struck down significant provisions of
Pennsylvania's Abortion Control Act of 1982 on the ground that
the Act's required disclosures, reporting requirements, and medical
choices as to the method by which viable fetuses should be aborted
156. In re A.C., 533 A.2d 611, 616-17 (D.C. 1987).
157. Id. at 617.
158. Id.
159. See Gallagher, supra note 151, at 15-16; Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights:
Conflicts with Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy and Equal Protection, 95
YALE U. 599, 614 (1986); Nelson, Buggy & Weil, supra note 114, at 739-45; Nelson & Miii-
ken, supra note 117, at 1061-62; Rhoden, Judge in Delivery Room, supra note 114, at 1953,
1965-66, 1989-94.
160. 106 S. Ct. 2169 (1986).
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unconstitutionally interfered with the decision making process of
pregnant women and their physicians. One provision that was
struck down, for example, required that obstetricians aborting a
viable fetus should use "'the abortion technique ... which would
provide the best opportunity for the unborn child to be aborted
alive unless,' in the physician's good-faith judgment, that tech-
nique 'would present a significantly greater medical risk to the life
or health of the pregnant woman.' ",s' In the view of the majority,
the imposition by the state of a "significant" medical risk on the
pregnant woman rendered the statute "facially invalid.' '162
The disagreement over the meaning of the Supreme Court's
abortion decisions crystallizes the essence of the debate over forced
obstetrical interventions. The clear message of Thornburgh, as well
as the Supreme Court's other abortion decisions,16' is that the
mother's interests in making her own health decisions must take
precedence over the state's interest in preserving fetal health and
life when those interests conflict, at least when the mother still has
the right to have an abortion. What must await future decisions,
however, is whether the Court would give added weight to the
161. Id. at 2182-83 (quoting § 3210(b) of the Act).
162. Id. See also Kennedy & Nicolazzo, Abortion: Toward a Standard Based Upon
Clinical Medical Signs of Life and Death, 23 J. FAM. L. 545, 559 (1984-1985) (under a pro-
posed abortion standard based upon the fetus' vital signs, "[i]n the final trimester, as now,
the viability of the fetus would still establish the state's compelling interest in potential
human life and would override the woman's interest in privacy, but could not override her
interest in her own life or health") (emphasis added).
Three of the four dissenting justices in Thornburgh appeared to disagree with the no-
tion that the state's interest in preserving fetal life should be subordinated to the pregnant
woman's health and safety interests. See, e.g., Thornburgh, 106 S. Ct. at 2191 (Burger, C.J.,
dissenting) ("No governmental power exists to say that a viable fetus should not have every
protection required to preserve its life.") (emphasis added); id. at 2204 (White & Rehn-
quist, JJ., dissenting) ("If. . . a compelling state interest may justify the imposition of some
physical danger upon an individual, and if, as the Court has held, the State has a compelling
interest in the preservation of the life of a viable fetus, I find the majority's unwillingness to
tolerate the imposition of any nonnegligible risk of injury to a pregnant woman in order to
protect the life of her viable fetus in the course of an abortion baffling.") (emphasis in origi-
nal). With respect to § 3510(b), Justice O'Connor would have adopted a construction of the
statute, rejected by the majority, that equated "significantly greater risk" to maternal life or
health with "real and identifiable" risk, resulting in "little possibility that a woman's abor-
tion decision will be unduly burdened by risks falling below that threshold." Id. at 2216
(O'Connor, J., dissenting).
163. See generally Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 400 (1979) (Pennsylvania statute
held invalid because, among other things, it did not "clearly specify . . . that the woman's
life and health must always prevail over the fetus' life and health when they conflict");
Planned Parenthood Ass'n v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 482 (1983) (abortion statute must be
interpreted so as to avoid increasing the risks to the health of the mother).
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states' interest in preserving fetal life and promoting fetal health
where the mother has made the decision not to have an abortion.
In Professor Robertson's view, such a change in the mother's
intention would be critical: the decision to give up one's right to
abort the fetus and, instead, to carry the child to term, imposes
serious moral and legal obligations on the mother to take all rea-
sonable steps to ensure the child's health."" Under this view, the
surrogate with a viable fetus might be regarded as doubly obli-
gated, both as a matter of the state's law regarding postviability
abortions and as a result of her contractual obligations. The risk is
that a judge might be influenced by the existence of the contract
more readily to authorize an unwanted medical procedure.
Whether or not the jurisdiction is one in which such authorizations
have been granted, the use of the surrogate's prior agreement as an
additional basis for granting the request of a hospital or natural
father would be an unwarranted extension of the contract.
There is a risk, however, that the surrogate arrangement will
have a subtle influence on the outlook of a judge presented with a
surrogate mother who refuses to consent to a particular treatment
or invasive diagnostic procedure and a request for an order to com-
pel the intervention. To the extent courts are increasingly willing
to order obstetrical interventions for the fetus' benefit, a judge
may be inclined to view the surrogate mother as a "fetal
container"'65 who is contractually obligated to accept the label and
the consequences that flow from it. Ironically, to avoid charges of
baby selling, the proponents of surrogacy have urged the public to
accept their characterization of the practice as "womb leasing," or
the mere provision of gestational services. These characterizations,
however, carry additional rhetorical and emotional baggage by fos-
tering an image of the surrogate mother as simply the means by
which an infertile couple can achieve their desired ends. The image
that is thus created may well diminish a judge's receptiveness to a
defense that is based upon the surrogate's personal rights of pri-
vacy, autonomy, and self-determination.
164. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 138, at 437-38. In his view, the diffi-
cult question of the state's power to compel interventions involves a practice of "dubious
public policy," Robertson, Correspondence, supra note 144, but a permissible one in certain
circumstances. Robertson, Procreative Liberty, supra note 138, at 437.
165. The phrase is from Professor Annas, one of the most perceptive and vocal oppo-
nents of compelled obstetrical interventions. See Annas, Fetal Containers, supra note 5, at
13. See also Annas, Protecting Liberty, supra note 5, at 1213.
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The surrogate who insists on her right to be free from noncon-
sensual interventions could well encounter subtle forms of discrim-
ination. As the authors of the New England Journal of Medicine
survey pointed out, most of the women who have been ordered to
submit to obstetrical interventions were Black, Asian, or Hispanic,
and all were either being treated at teaching hospital clinics or
were receiving some form of public assistance."6 The strong infer-
ence from these data is that a factor that may have influenced the
hospitals to seek a court order and the judges to issue one was the
economic status, race, or ethnicity of the mothers, which may have
made it more difficult for the physicians and judges involved to be
empathetic with the women's refusals. Similarly, a nonconsenting
surrogate mother-whose motivations to be a surrogate may seem
mysterious and whose decision to bear a child and surrender it to a
stranger unfathomable-may run the risk that her refusal to con-
sent to a Cesarean section or to fetal surgery will be given shorter
shrift than the refusal of a woman whose pregnancy is in their view
more "normal."
A surrogate mother's objections to a form of treatment or di-
agnostic test, however, should be evaluated in the same manner
and against the same norms as a nonsurrogate's. Both are free, au-
tonomous individuals with the same rights of privacy and self-de-
termination. The "fetal container" label is equally inapt for both
surrogate and nonsurrogate pregnant women whether the contro-
versy concerns custody of the child or the mother's right to refuse
to consent to an unwanted medical intervention.
In jurisdictions that have recognized the courts' power to or-
der such interventions, no different treatment should be accorded
the surrogate simply on the basis that she is a surrogate. For exam-
ple, the issue of the competency of the mother is latent in any re-
fusal to consent case, and the courts have the power to order an
examination to determine the mother's competency. The courts
should not presume that the surrogate is incompetent from the
sole fact that she is a surrogate any more than they would presume
incompetency in any other case. Most especially, the surrogate
should not be deemed to have waived or contracted away her per-
sonal right to object to a proposed intervention. To do so would
raise a most chilling prospect. If courts were to allow a pregnant
woman to be depersonalized on the basis of a contract, the next
166. See Court-Ordered Interventions, supra note 118, at 1193.
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and all too easy step would be to regard all pregnant women as
"fetal containers" on the basis of their status as pregnant women.
Even in jurisdictions rejecting an absolutist view of a woman's
rights, the balancing test for determining the appropriateness of
compelling a medical intervention requires that a woman's rights
of privacy and autonomous self-determination be seriously consid-
ered. The first step toward regarding the rights of all pregnant
women less seriously should not be taken by treating the rights of
surrogate women less seriously.
III. CONCLUSION
Surrogate motherhood provides an alternative method of re-
production for infertile couples, but it is a method that contains
great risks. 1 7 As the Baby M case illustrates, the parties do not
necessarily know what they are setting themselves up for when
they begin their partnership. The contract itself is an imperfect
device for protecting the parties against untoward developments,
and as courts and legislatures take a closer look at the practice, the
parties may find, as they did in the Baby M case, that the contract
provides no protection at all.
As surrogate contracts are currently being written, it is the
surrogate mother who gives up the most. She promises to give up
the child at the end of the pregnancy, and she also promises to
surrender her rights of autonomy and self-determination during
the pregnancy. While the father's desire to protect himself against
foreseeable risks is understandable, the potential impact of abor-
tion and medical care provisions on the surrogate mother is
extreme.
This article has considered the nature of the surrogate
mother's promises-not to have an abortion except if the natural
father insists, to consent to all recommended medical treatments
for the benefit of the fetus and herself-and the difficulties they
raise both for the principals and for the legal and medical profes-
sions. This article proposes to make specific performance of the
abortion provisions impossible to obtain and specific performance
of the medical care provisions no more obtainable than would oth-
erwise be the case if there were no surrogate contract at all. If phy-
167. See In re Baby M, No. A-39-87, slip op. at 94-95 (N.J. Feb. 3, 1988) (describing
surrogacy and other examples of "the new reproductive biotechnology" as a "troubling, yet
promising, area").
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sicians and judges resist the temptation to depersonalize the surro-
gate, at least she will not have given up her most fundamental
rights of privacy and autonomy.
According the surrogate her full measure of autonomy, how-
ever, does not mean that she is fully protected from the conse-
quences of her original promises. Although she should not be sub-
jected to medical treatment against her will, or restrained from
having an abortion if she would otherwise have that right, neither
should she be able to walk away from her agreement with impu-
nity. The probability that many of the provisions are void, unen-
forceable by injunction, or not subject to damages, does not mean
that there is no obligation. The challenge that surrogacy presents
to both the legal and the medical professions is to achieve some
measure of justice in balancing contract rights without doing dam-
age to the human rights that are involved.
